

# Controlling Gaze, Chess Play and Seduction in Dance: Phenomenological Analysis of the Natural Attitude of the Body in Modern Ballroom Dance

Gediminas Karoblis

Norwegian University of Science and Technology

*The article introduces the phenomenological idea of 'natural attitude' in the field of dance. Three phenomena, which very clearly show the embodiment of the natural attitude and its resistance to the requirements of dance, are analyzed. The 'controlling gaze' is the natural tendency to look at the limbs and follow their movements instead of proprioceptive control. The 'chess play' is a natural tendency of moving on the flat surface and ignoring the volume of movement. The 'seduction' is a natural tendency to lose the body-self because of an interference with the other's body. The dancing body has constantly to deal with these natural inclinations. And a dance teacher has to understand this split between 'ought' and 'is'.*

*The basis of concrete movements is a given world,  
and the basis of abstract movements is created.*

—Maurice Merleau-Ponty<sup>1</sup>

In this essay I am going to analyze the phenomena that I regularly observe and consider in my practice of teaching and learning dance. The results of the research were obtained during the classes of dance sport and modern ballroom dance in Lithuania. The age of observed dance students ranges from 3 to 70 years, including separate groups of children of pre-school age, groups of children in primary, secondary schools, groups of students, couples preparing for 'the wedding-Waltz', middle-aged couples and elderly people. The research didn't aim at sociological conclusions; therefore there was no attempt at critical analysis of social representativeness of subjects observed. The hypothesis proposed in this essay has to be treated as a working (weak) thesis which was extracted from observations in the definite context. Therefore the stronger thesis, that the phenomena described and analyzed further are regular phenomena, which can be observed or experienced by any dance teacher or dance student in any part of the world, still has to be verified or falsified either on the basis of second-person methods (cross-cultural observations), or third-person methods (neurobiological, biometrical data). In case of falsification of some aspects of the stronger thesis, the results concerning these aspects of research would remain valid as the

explication of the definite cultural horizon, and could be further understood as the analysis of the features of the definite bodily tradition, in particular, extended European bodily tradition.

As a rule, modern ballroom dance teachers in their books popularize their understanding of dance and a personal philosophy of dance. One can find a lot of truthful and useful insights in their books, but the problem is that these are formulated unsystematically, without any substantial connection with a scientific discourse.<sup>2</sup> The fact is that the first coherent scientific study in the field was offered by Ruud Vermey ten years ago. Vermey states the substantial lack of scientific research in the field of modern ballroom dance: “In any bookstore, library or dance institutions we find publications about dance related to Ballet, Jazz Dance and Modern Dance. In what is called the ballroom dance world, however, we find mostly videos and popular magazines. The frivolity attached to dance studies in this field might be another reason why Ballroom Dancing—Standard as well as Latin, even when it is performed on a very high level indeed—is quite often not taken seriously”.<sup>3</sup> Supporting Vermey’s thesis, I argue that the research of modern ballroom dance is extremely fragmented. These very few researchers of modern ballroom dance follow different methods, such as phenomenology, ethnography, social criticism, but do not engage into any discussion, ignoring each other. Elsewhere I have already presented and analyzed the implications of this situation.<sup>4</sup>

The methodological tool of this research is phenomenology developed by the Husserlian tradition of contemporary philosophy. The founding phenomenologists (Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer and others) remembered dance only casually as an example of bodily skill or entertainment, but took no efforts in thorough phenomenological description or understanding of it.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, dance in comparison with other art forms was included into the phenomenological aesthetics and phenomenological anthropology relatively late. Nevertheless, it should be stated that the tradition of phenomenology of dance is emerging, thus far maintained by individual attempts. It could be stated that various phenomenological approaches were already tested in dance—more about this in my review of phenomenology of dance.<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, much still is left to be done.

In this essay I introduce the phenomenological concept of ‘natural attitude’ (Husserl)—the concept, which is crucial in the discourse on the method itself. The phenomena which will be described further thus could be

explained as phenomena of the natural attitude of the body that characterize the usual handling of the parts of the body and patterns of kinetic behavior—natural body schema.<sup>7</sup> In addition, it should be noticed that bodily behavior that is caused by the natural attitude is not considered as being natural in terms of natural science, but, first of all, in terms of the being in the world.<sup>8</sup> For a reader who is not so much concerned about the coherence of the phenomenology, I suggest to understand the ‘natural attitude’ as the ‘habitual attitude’ (it does not contradict the Husserlian conceptual apparatus). Thus, a lot of misconceptions and debates related with the word ‘natural’ might be avoided.

### *Natural attitude*

What are the features of the natural attitude? The concept of the natural attitude (tr. by Dorion Cairns) or standpoint (tr. by W.R. Boyce Gibson) was suggested by Edmund Husserl (*Einstellung*—in original): “Our first outlook upon life is that of natural human beings, imaging, judging, feeling, willing, “*from the natural standpoint*” ... *The arithmetical world is there for me only when and so long as I occupy the arithmetical standpoint.* But the *natural world, the world in the ordinary sense of the word, is constantly there for me ... prior to all “theory”*.”<sup>9</sup> The natural attitude entails belief in existence of the world.<sup>10</sup> The natural attitude of the body is the body schema on the basis of which the body pre-reflectively acts in relation to itself, environment, animate forms and human beings.<sup>11</sup> It means, we are confident that our body is somehow pre-attuned to the environment. The being is immersed in the world: it is the “embodied consciousness” and the “embedded body”. It is typical to refer to kinesthetic experience in conscious acts: I “measure” things “with” my body as being right or left, up or down, far or near from it. And my body attunes to the environment and things around it: I jump to get something higher, I walk to get something further and I lean to get something lower, and the form of a thing “suggests” to me how to grasp it and bring it to another place safely. It is also important that I meet other egos that coexist with mine in prereflective bodily and environmental coherence of our world. Therefore my bodily behavior is always “inscribed” in the natural environment and the social relationship. Notice that there is no theoretical distinction between the natural and the social included in this phenomenological preface. It comes out in reflection later, but primarily my body is not given for me separated into natural and social pieces. It is given

for me in the holistic natural attitude *in ordinary sense* and *prior to all theory*. For a 'native mover' (like a native speaker) the 'bodily games' (cf. 'language games' of Wittgenstein) are naturally inscribed in situations. Some bodily movements of people may seem unnatural for a stranger, but for a 'native mover' both biologically and socially constituted movements (bowing to get a stone from the ground and bowing to welcome a person) prereflectively seems to be equally natural. In this context, the concept of 'natural' refers to the natural flow of everyday life. An event or an action that is conceived as contradictory in this flow is experienced as unnatural.

Nevertheless, it seems that only theoretical reflection and hybridization of pure phenomenology with conceptual explanatory analysis that derives from dominating hermeneutics of natural science might represent the position that is defined above in more detail. Let's consider two differences—the difference between 'type' and 'token' and the difference between 'genetic' and 'social'. Then, 'genetic type' will be defined for us as genetically encoded human species. From this point of view: natural (for us) is to be human. And the limit question for this sphere of naturalness was posited by Thomas Nagel: 'What is it like to be a bat?'.<sup>12</sup> How much is our representation of the world defined by our nature? Next, it is possible to contra posit 'genetic type' (first nature) and 'social type' (second nature). Which bodily behavior is typical genetically and which—socially? For example, Brenda Farnell strongly criticized the widely-cited thesis of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson about metaphors we live by as human beings<sup>13</sup>, arguing that the metaphors that the authors analyze as universal are, in fact, cultural—defined by extended European bodily schemata.<sup>14</sup> If the argument is true, we are forced either to extend the concept 'natural' from 'genetic type' to 'social type' or to reserve it only to phenomena that belong to 'genetic type'. It is also possible to differentiate between 'genetic type' and 'genetic token'—each individual as 'genetic token' has some specific features that are natural for it as the individual. It is also possible to differentiate 'social type' and 'social token'—specific personal traces of the body (caused not only by the particular genetic combination, but also by the individual history of the body). The dance is the confession of the body, in a sense, that it discloses the genetic type (first nature) and the social type (second nature) of the body, the genetic (first nature) and the social individuality (second nature) of the body. It discloses not only the dance that is intended to be danced, but also the natural and/or habitual attitude/s that is/are encapsulated in the archeology of the body.

In the given essay, bodily movements in spite of their generative differences (genetic type—genetic token/social type—social token), mentioned above, for a person seem to be natural, because they are *constantly there for her* in the natural flow of the bodily movement. A person who wants to learn to dance comes to a dance class already having a huge amount of “bodily presuppositions”—the natural bodily attitude. A dance is not created on the *tabula rasa* (the clear table)—it is created in the given natural flow of the bodily movement. The dancerly attitude covers the natural attitude. The natural attitude of the body is particularly noticeable in the movements of beginners, when they learn what is, for them, an unnatural movement of dance. It evokes the conflict between the habitual social type of everyday socially encoded movement and a new social bodily type of a new social dance. The same happens with the dancers that are experienced in other dance techniques, but in the new technique of dance they have no experience. It evokes the conflict between the habitual social type of dance and a new social type of a new social dance. Moreover, the natural attitude of the body is always present and influences even the most skilled dancer, like the natural attitude in understanding influences even the most rigid scholar or the most skeptic philosopher. It is extremely difficult even for the professional dancer to change the mind and the style immediately, when the dances of different style and character follow each other—the natural flow of the previous dance has very strong inertia. The natural attitude of the body is never transcended, but always remains immanent, whether the dance is *playfully based* on the natural attitude of the body (as Isadora Duncan distinguished her dance separating it from the tradition of ballet) or constructed *in playful opposition* to it (as Merce Cunningham in his experimental dances showed in the most obvious way).

There are a lot of movements in dance that are not performed in everyday life. Undoubtedly, the full spin of the body is unnatural in a sense that it is practically purposeless. Usually, in everyday movement, it is enough to turn partially—in the direction where one expects to find something or where one’s attention is attracted. Likewise, there is an obvious “neutralization” of natural swinging of hands and shoulders in the modern ballroom dances, because of the closed hold.<sup>15</sup> And the most casual, but very problematic movement, which is also unnatural in this sense, is going back facing against the direction of the movement. It is natural for the body to move facing forward. And just as children learn to walk in a normal manner, one has to learn to go backwards in dance. It is not difficult to notice

that the phenomenology of the dance as if reverses the central role of *the phenomenology of the face*.

It is not possible to escape the natural attitude of the body. One after another appear the phenomena which are like setback to the natural attitude of the body in the dance. Now let's analyze several phenomena in detail. It will clearly show the relation of the natural attitude of the body to the requirements of the dance.

### *Controlling gaze*

At the beginning those who learn to dance look at their feet very often. Why? Let us do an exercise and try to move with closed eyes. It is not difficult to move on the spot. But when our movements become more locomotive we become afraid to strike against something. So, learning to dance, do we look at our feet because we are afraid to strike against something? Yes, sometimes following our feet with the gaze we are afraid they will strike the feet of the partner. This happens when the feet are too near between partners as in the figures *entrados* (crisscrossing of the legs) in Argentinean Tango. But in fact looking at the feet happens in other cases as well when actually there is no obvious danger and a person dances alone, for example. Therefore, there are other causes and explanations of gazing at the feet. Actually, this phenomenon exemplifies the intention to control the body and to monitor the bodily movement visually. Maxine Sheets-Johnstone writes:

The reflected-upon body is always an externally related system of parts and never a totality which is lived. As an objective system of parts, the body is often regarded as an instrument of consciousness, an instrument explicitly recognized as carrying out whatever consciousness intends. Such is frequently the situation in learning a new skill, for example, because the body, while it understands the intentional act, is not yet able to coordinate its gestures toward a realization of that act.<sup>16</sup>

It is interesting that this phenomenon confirms the enactive view of perception proposed by Alva Noë.<sup>17</sup> Normally, action, thought and visual perception are integrated (*ibid.*), but in dancing the visual perception suddenly becomes less relevant in relation to proprioception and touch and requires changing our habitual perceiving of the world by visual tracking of the objects. At the beginning of learning a dance the vision often takes over

and suppresses the kinesthesia. Closing the eyes and “bracketing” the vision, we might reinforce our kinesthesia.<sup>18</sup> But why nonetheless do we want our gaze to follow our feet? Let us look at *how* it happens: our gaze “persecutes” the movements of the feet checking which foot is moving and comparing the imagined pattern of the dance movements with the visually perceived pattern of the dance movements. “Persecuting” gaze appears because of the imagined “ideal” dance pattern, which is, according to somebody who is learning to dance, enough to implement. The gaze controls how the imagined dance pattern is being implemented. The person creates in her mind the abstract pattern of the dance and later she compares the real view with the imagined one.<sup>19</sup> However, none of these patterns is kinesthetic (both have the visual basis—one is imagined from the “inside”, and the other is seen from the “outside”). But is the imagined pattern of the dance adequate to the kinesthetic pattern that is to be achieved? Actually, the gaze that checks the feet does not lead to the kinesthetic development. The conflict between the visual and the kinesthetic appears at the moment when the visual suppresses the autonomy of kinesthesia. Therefore, in the first phase, our bodily behavior in dance classes is too ocular-centric.

Another interpretation of the phenomenon might be suggested following the ideas of Erwin Straus and Herbert Spiegelberg. Straus posits the question ‘where is the ego in the body?’ and answers: “The ‘I’ of the awake, active person is centered in the region at the base of the nose, between the eyes; in the dance it descends into the trunk.”<sup>20</sup> So the essential shift has to take place when changing the bodily attitude from the everyday to the dancerly. How much do social and genetic types define this everyday ocularcentrism? The upright posture is clearly very strong factor that influences the whole flow of our bodily movement. But there are social differences of the body image as well, as Seymour Kleinman asserts: “One of the courses I teach is called “Human Movement Theory” and I often begin the first class by asking, “Where is your mind?” Usually, the students will immediately point to (or place their hands on) their heads. However, several years ago one person offered a different response: He placed his hand on his heart. He also happened to be the only one in the class who was not an American. He was an African student from Nigeria.”<sup>21</sup>

This ocular-centrism as the natural attitude of the body is implicated in the other practices of learning and, on the other hand, may be the consequence of these practices. Let’s consider the practice of learning to write. Bodily movements of the hand are controlled by the gaze, following the

images that appear as the consequence of these movements. And the “correct image” is taken to be the main purpose of the practice of writing. The gaze does not follow the movement of the hand; it follows the appearance of the letters. The “correct movement” of the hand is supposed. Likely, the movement of the hand is subordinated to the gaze that controls the image of the mouse pointer on the monitor. In dance practice the same relation is expressed in the important role of the mirror. The dancer repeats the movement of the body facing the mirror. It makes her body kinesthetically transparent: the attention is focused not on the kinesthetic feeling of the body, but on the mirror image of the body. The kinesthesia is subordinated to the image and to the gaze which monitors the image. The practices that occupy the main part of our time influence the natural attitude of our bodies. Therefore, as the consequence of constant “monitoring”, it becomes natural to learn dancing in the same way as to learn writing—under the guidance of the controlling gaze.

*“The chess play”—the domination of locomotion*

Because of the natural attitude of the body, there exists the tendency of moving on the flat surface and ignoring the volume of the movement. The usual position of the body is vertical, but the main part of the purposeful movement of the body, which we are consciously aware of, is locomotion. I am aware that I am going to get a pencil on the table, but most often I am not aware of the swinging of my hands and shoulders. This influences dance learning. For example, the main step of Cuban cha cha—*the chasse* (the feet moving side-together-side)—may be followed by the returning chasse. Performing it beginners frequently move too far sidelong (in a style of locomotion), and when they dance faster, they even are not back in the right moment to the music, because it is too difficult for them to fight inertia of the body. This phenomenon obviously displays the natural attitude of the body. Even seeing (!) the correct realization of the dance (as in the example of cha cha above), a beginner does not “read” it as a whole. Here it is necessary to remember the incongruity between the imagined pattern and the kinesthetic pattern. The beginner abstracts the essential (for her/him) aspects of movement and tries to articulate them. For example, he or she recognizes the movement of feet on the flat surface—the directions forward, backward, left and right. But this “attachment” to the feet, which was also evident in the considerations of the first phenomenon, is misleading. For



example, quite often the upper part of the body remains still in the dance when the feet move sideways (this is especially characteristic to Latin American social dances). However, the beginner does not notice that. He or she moves the rest (upper) part of the body together and does not separate the upper and the lower parts of the body—therefore the phenomenon of the chess play, as I call it, appears. It is like movement of a solid “Newtonian” piece of substance from one place to another—the locomotion. That’s why I called this phenomenon “the chess play” phenomenon: it is like pushing a piece of chess on the table. This phenomenon shows how it is natural for the person to situate the body on the map. It might be even said that in the normal three dimensions space the chess piece might remain solid and undifferentiated moving from place to place in the cube. In dance, against the natural attitude of the body, it is necessary to “abstract” body parts creating more complex patterns of movement in comparison to the everyday requirements. One might need to fix one part of the body while the other part stays free and mobile thus differentiating the body.<sup>22</sup> It is well known that the social type of extended European body schema is more straight than curved, more extrinsically locomotive than intrinsically self-differentiating. There is a study by Japanese scientists that demonstrates that this differentiation of the upper and lower body parts is unnatural for Japanese people as well. They tend to move like the chess pieces.<sup>23</sup>

Let’s compare classical and modern social dance styles as different types of dance. The verticality of the body is maintained in the natural attitude, in general, and modern theatrical dancers tried to challenge this body-schematic presupposition of classical dance. The founders of modern ballroom dance (dance sport) tradition claimed that modern ballroom dances are natural because they are based on walking, i.e. locomotive movement.<sup>24</sup> And it makes this tradition different from the “unnatural” tradition of the classical dance. The latter does not take the most natural human movement—walking—as the basis of dance. It should be noticed that the “collection” of different body parts in the vertical position is expressed much more strongly in the skilled dancer’s body, especially in the body of a classical dancer.<sup>25</sup> To say it more exactly, there is the imagined upper point to which dancers “hang” the body in the body of the skilled classical (and—to some extent—modern social) dancer in contrast to the natural attitude of the non dancer (with some exceptions depending on ‘token genetics’).<sup>26</sup> The body that is hung on the imagined hook can swing notably (a piece of chess does not swing; it is pushed on the table). The upper point here plays the same role as the

holder of a marionette—the body “hung” on it keeps the vertical position, in which the body is “collected” around the imagined axis. Here we can remember the description of the marionette as the ideal “dancer,” written by German writer Heinrich Kleist.<sup>27</sup> The marionette touches the ground for a very short moment in order to make this touch the beginning of new and “free” movement. Indeed, the marionette moves as if dancing. Its movements express the play of the mechanic powers. This play creates the possibility of an aesthetic evaluation of the movement of the marionette. The dancer seeks for the same effect and the skilled dancer, with whom Kleist talked about this, is completely right. Although there is one difference: the marionette is held from above and its feet just dangle loosely. Meanwhile the dancer achieves the ‘marionette effect’ only with the help of special exercises. Modern ballroom dance theoreticians suggest the alternative to the ‘sense of marionette’ as the phenomenological paradigm of the classical dance. They say that the phenomenological paradigm for a modern ballroom dancer is the sense of the body being like a car and the feet being like well amortizing tires. It makes it possible to clarify the phenomenological difference between the background feeling of classical and modern ballroom dance. In the latter the basic aim is smooth horizontal movement, which is similar to the movement of a car. And the success of the dance depends on the pushing power and the “amortization” of the feet as the movement of a car depends on the engine power and the adhesion of the tires.<sup>28</sup>

### *The phenomenon of “seduction”*

After having comparatively well learned the solo steps of dance in the neutralized conditions of the dance class, beginners are confused when it is necessary to dance the same steps as a couple or in another situation. The only exception is mimetic steps, i.e. when there is the possibility of easy copying. Though, for example, in social dance each partner separately creates the synthesis of her/his movements, this synthesis is challenged and even destroyed when it comes to dancing together. The new synthesis integrating both partners is needed. It seems that the body of the other “detaches” some parts of my body. Therefore I have named this ‘the phenomenon of seduction’. When the other body appears near mine, it “seduces” the parts of my body and destroys the acquired habitual unity of the body. Therefore, the natural attitude includes the seduction of the other body. Paradoxically enough, but the natural attitude comes to the fore in both cases: in being

bodily egocentric and moving like a piece of chess and in being seduced and “deconstructed” by the other body.

What is destroyed or seduced in this situation? As it was stated before, the concept of ‘body schema’ is the best answer to this question. According to Shaun Gallagher:

in contrast to the reflective intentionality of the body image, a *body schema* involves a system of motor capacities, abilities, and habits that enable movement and the maintenance of posture. The body schema is not a perception, a belief, or an attitude. Rather, it is a system of motor and postural functions that operate below the level of self-referential intentionality, although such functions can enter into and support intentional activity. The preconscious, sub-personal processes carried out by the body- schema system are tacitly keyed into the environment and play a dynamic role in governing posture and movement.<sup>29</sup>

In the case of “bodily seduction” my body is divided and disjointed by the body of the being-nearby. When I give my hand to somebody else, it becomes not only my hand, but also the hand which finally is “hung in the space” between two handling sources. This example is often mentioned by Merleau-Ponty, who in his late writings paid much attention to inter-bodily relations, the reversibility and the phenomenon of chiasm, demonstrated in the example above.<sup>30</sup> The example of “intersection of hands” appears in pro-Sartrean or pro-Levinian critics of the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. The critics assert that introducing *chair* as the basis of reversibility in the inter-bodily space (a very Aristotelian idea) Merleau-Ponty loses an essential asymmetrical difference between *my* and *his/her* (hand).<sup>31</sup> For example, Beata Stawarska emphasizes that to give a hand to somebody is not the same as to clasp the hands together: “the logics of the mirror” can not govern intra- and inter- bodily relations at the same time.<sup>32</sup> My example of dancing in the couple does not suppose the logics of the mirror; it supposes the affinity of our body-schema that is “seduced” by other body-schema.

The phenomenon of “seduction” shows that the strong power is not necessary in order to destroy a habitual unity of the body-schema. Often it is enough to glance from the side and this unity is destroyed (this happened for the Kipling’s centipede, when it reflected the other’s surprise, how it can manage so many legs). Not only the existence for the self, which is observed in the phenomenon of the “chess play”, but also the existence for the other,

which is observed in the phenomenon of “seduction” is inscribed in the natural attitude of the body.

Therefore there is an essential difference between individual and non-individual dances (in a couple, a group or in a contact improvisation). In the individual dance, the only “seductive” influence from the side may be the observing gaze. When the couple dances, the dance is born in the “play” of two bodies. None of the bodies is the addition of the other; that is why at the beginning of the dance the parts of the body begin to flounce between two centers of the movement. Finally, the body has to create such unity of the habitual movement (without losing its own identity) in which each movement has inscribed a complementarily relation to the movement of the other body.<sup>32</sup> Therefore, in the couple dance each movement of the body has a sense only in *Paarung* (Husserl), like a shoe.

### *Conclusion*

It is possible to enumerate more phenomena that disclose the natural attitude of the body and to find “unnatural” movements that are performed in dance, but the main thesis is already evident enough. The dancing body has constantly to deal with the bodily natural flow—the natural attitude—whatever the “nature” of it: genetic (type or token) or social (type or token). From this point of view, the dance is the abstract art form. Finishing with the words of Merleau-Ponty, “the basis of concrete movements is a given world, and the basis of abstract movements is created.” I leave this reflection open for further intra- and inter-subjective researches and replenishments.

### *Notes*

<sup>1</sup> Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of perception*, tr. Alphonso Lingis, (New York: Routledge, 1996), p.111.

<sup>2</sup> The classical works concerning the history and technique of modern ballroom dance: Alex Moore, *Ballroom Dancing* (London: Pitman Press, 9<sup>th</sup> edition, 1977); Victor Silvester, *Modern ballroom dancing: history and practice* (London: Cresset, 4<sup>th</sup> edition, 1977); Walter Laird, *Technique of Latin Dancing* (New York: Revisionist Press, 1984). The above mentioned authors are the founders of the codified modern ballroom dance tradition. Their remarks about modern ballroom dance are really valuable and historically important, but they did not introduce or encourage a scientific research.

<sup>3</sup> Ruud Vermey, *Latin. Thinking, Sensing and Doing in Latin American Dancing* (München: Kastel Verlag, 1994), p.14.

<sup>4</sup> Gediminas Karoblis, "Toward Global Workspace: a Case with Dance Sport Research", *Proceedings of the conference "North in the global Context"* organized by NOFOD - Nordic Forum for Dance research, January 12–15th, 2006, (in press).

<sup>5</sup> Elizabeth A. Behnke, Maureen Connolly, "Dance", *Encyclopedia of Phenomenology*, ed. L. Embree (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997): 129–133.

<sup>6</sup> Gediminas Karoblis, "Dance", *Handbook of Phenomenological Aesthetics*, eds. Lester Embree and Hans R. Sepp, Springer (in press).

<sup>7</sup> Shaun Gallagher and Jonathan Cole. "Body Schema and Body Image in a Deaf-ferented Subject," *Journal of Mind and Behavior* 16 (1995), 369–390.

<sup>8</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1993).

<sup>9</sup> Edmund Husserl, *Ideas. General introduction to pure Phenomenology*, tr. by W.R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Collier books, 1972), p.91ff.

<sup>10</sup> Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, tr. by Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977).

<sup>11</sup> Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of perception*, tr. Alphonso Lingis, (New York: Routledge, 1996).

<sup>12</sup> Thomas Nagel, "What is it like to be a bat?" *The Philosophical Review* LXXXIII 4. October. 1974: 435–50.

<sup>13</sup> George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors we live by* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

<sup>14</sup> Brenda Farnell, "Metaphors we Move by," *Visual Anthropology*, vol. 8, Nr. 2–4, (1996): 311–335.

<sup>15</sup> Herbert u. Ursula Stuber, *Standart tanzen. Von A – Z* (München: Kastel Verlag, 1998), p. 40ff.

<sup>16</sup> Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, *The Phenomenology of Dance* (London: Dance books Ltd., 1979, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed.), p.27.

<sup>17</sup> Alva Noë, "Précis of Action in Peception" *PSYCHE: an interdisciplinary journal of research on consciousness* 12/1, 2006, <http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/>, 2006-11-30.

<sup>18</sup> Sartre gave an interesting example, in which kinesthesia and vision were confronted: he imagined the swing and tried to observe the page number without moving his eyes, but this was impossible, because either eyes moved or it was impossible to imagine the swing. (Jean Paul Sartre, Voobrazhaemoe. Fenomenologicheskaja psichologija voobrazhenia, tr. from French to Russian M. Beketova, Moskva: Nauka, 2001, p.160).

<sup>19</sup> As far as I can judge from my experience, men (in Lithuania) particularly tend to use this method of learning: instead of direct mimesis, they create the intermediary imagined (often even verbalized) pattern.

<sup>20</sup> Erwin Straus, "The Forms of Spatiality" [1930], *Phenomenological Psychology*, tr. by Erling Eng (London: Tavistock Publications, 1966), p.26. See also Herbert Spiegelberg, "On the Motility of the Ego" [1966], *Phenomenology: Critical Concepts in Philosophy*, Embree, Lester and Moran Dermot (eds.), vol. 2, (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 217–232..

<sup>21</sup> Seymour Kleinman, "Moving Into Awareness" <http://www.coe.ohio-state.edu/skleinman/moving.htm>. 2006-11-27.

<sup>22</sup> Helmut Günther, *Die Tänze und Riten der afro-amerikaner* (Bonn: Verlag Dance Motion, 1982), the chapter "Die Grundtechniken des afrikanischen Tanzes" (s.19ff.). The fixing of the upper part of the body and relaxing the lower part he calls the position of *Collapse*.

<sup>23</sup> Noriko Nagata et all. "Analysis and Synthesis of Latin Dance Using Motion Capture Data." *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*. Aizawa et all. (eds.), vol. 3333, 2004, p. 39–44.

<sup>24</sup> Viktor Silvester, *Modern ballroom dancing: history and practice* (London: Cresset books, 1992, 4th ed.), p. 15–16.

<sup>25</sup> “The European way of dancing (both classical and ballroom dancing) requires that the dancer keep the body straight, tight, with the higher tonus of abdominal press and the muscles of the nates. Such centralized handling of the body control permits to perform the spin very exactly and to keep the balance; it creates conditions for the precision and clarity of the movement. The same features are valuable for the European gymnastics” (Tatjana Solomonovna Lisickaja, *Gimnastika i taniec*, Moskva: Moskovskij universitet, 1988, s.6).

<sup>26</sup> English dance teachers say: “Hang your head from a star!” See in Herbert u. Ursula Stuber, *Standart tanzen. Von A – Z* (München: Kastel Verlag, 1998), s.30.

<sup>27</sup> Heinrich Kleist, “Über das Marionettentheater” *Kleists werke in zwei Bänden*, hrsg. u. eingel. v. H. Brandt (Berlin-Weimar, 1985), s.314-321.

<sup>28</sup> The comparison of dance feeling and feeling as if you drive the best car the teachers of the modern ballroom dance use quite often (Harry Smith-Hampshire, “The Making of a Champion,” *Dance news*. Ed. No. 1507, p.3). And it is not an accidental metaphor; the relation between the modern era of “automobilization” and understanding of the body in the modern ballroom dance, which emerged at the same time, is too obvious.

<sup>29</sup> Shaun Gallagher and Jonathan Cole, “Body Schema and Body Image in a Deafferented Subject,” *Journal of Mind and Behavior* 16 (1995), p.369–370.

<sup>30</sup> Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Das Sichtbare und das Unsichtbare*, üb. Regula Giuliani u. Bernhard Waldenfels, München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1994, p.172–203.

<sup>31</sup> Rolf Kühn, *Husserls Begriff der Passivität. Zur kritik der passiven Synthesis in der Genetischen Phänomenologie*, Freiburg: Alber Verlag, 1998, p.490ff..

<sup>32</sup> Beata Stawarska, “Reversibility and intersubjectivity in Merleau-Ponty’s ontology.” *The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, vol. 33, Nr.2, May, 2002: 155–166.

<sup>33</sup> This practice is the most clear example of the idea of Merleau-Ponty about intercorporeality, which is related to the idea of modern philosophy about the incomplete subjectivity. The dance of a couple is the creation of a subject, which is made of two complementary bodies.

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*Author's note:* Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Gediminas Karoblis at Norwegian University of Science and Technology. Email: [gkarobli@takas.lt](mailto:gkarobli@takas.lt).

In Proceedings of the 17th Symposium of the Study Group on Ethnochoreology: Dance and Its Socio-political Aspects; Dance and Costume, ed. Alexandra Doulmas and Irene Loutzaki, 117–26. Nafplion: Peloponisiako Laografiko Idrima. Karoblis, Gediminas 2007a "Controlling Gaze, Chess Play and Seduction in Dance: Phenomenological Analysis of the Natural Attitude of the Body in Modern Ballroom Dance." *Janus Head* 9/2:329–43. See also <http://www.janushead.org/9-2/Karoblis.pdf> (accessed 15 July 2010).