Bringing American Indian Experiences In: Toward a Research Agenda for IR

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[Author’s note: I have provided a link to this paper on my personal website so that Duck of Minerva readers can follow my guest blog post, “Bringing Indigenous Experiences into International Relations,” to the original source for some of my claims there. If you have any questions, about the blog post or this conference paper, I am happy to answer those via e-mail. You are welcome to cite this paper if you like. That said, I am no longer actively seeking this paper’s publication—bits and pieces of this paper instead found their way into the Duck of Minerva post and the two manuscripts I currently have under review: “Do Accidental Wars Happen? Evidence From America’s Indian Wars” and “Bringing the Rise of the United States into ‘Introduction to International Relations’”. If you are working on similar issues and inclined to cite any of my work, it might instead be worth citing those pieces, copies of which you can find just above the link you clicked to open this paper. Thanks for taking the time to read my work!]

Abstract: Political scientists have long payed little attention to the experiences of American Indian groups, but among the subfields, International Relations appears to lag even farther behind in this regard. I first provide data to summarize publication patterns on subjects involving American Indians within Political Science. I then make the case that today’s taken-for-granted assumption that “Indian affairs” is a domestic issue overlooks centuries in which U.S. interactions with American Indians were treated as matters of foreign policy. International Relations scholars, I argue, therefore ought to consider these interactions when collecting data, testing hypotheses, and otherwise seeking to enhance our understanding world politics. After providing illustrative vignettes drawn from the Indian Wars to demonstrate where IR scholars might find useful data, I discuss the ways in which such data might enrich and complicate our understanding of four subjects of debate within International Relations scholarship. I then provide some practical recommendations for the study of this long-neglected topic, and I conclude by making an argument for a more progressive Indian policy in the United States.
1. Introduction

Many political scientists, especially in the past couple decades, have sought to diversify the objects of their study so as to counter-act biases believed to enter scholarship through the lenses that a relatively homogeneous professoriate consciously or otherwise previously applied to its work. In a word, this has been described as an effort to “decolonize” political science (Jones 2006). As was recently noted in a provocative symposium in Perspectives on Politics, however, political scientists still all too frequently ignore American Indian groups as political actors (Ferguson 2016). While one can find the occasional article to demonstrate that American Indian groups have not been completely and forever ignored by political scientists generally or IR scholars specifically (such as Crawford 1994 or Cha 2015), it is relatively new to see a burgeoning literature within political science that takes American Indian experiences seriously. Nonetheless, much of this valuable literature has been produced by scholars working within other subfields; International Relations appears to be lagging behind.¹

In this paper, I argue that scholars of International Relations ought to bring American Indian experiences into our work. Given the dearth of prior IR work on the topic, there is little to be brought “back” in, as so many titles implore scholars to do.² I proceed as follows. First, I collect data from some of the major subfield journals to provide at least a cursory sense of how little IR scholars have studied American Indian groups. Second, I explain my rationale for positioning Indian affairs as an issue appropriate and useful for IR scholars to study. Third, after a series of brief vignettes, I delineate four issue areas within the study of IR in which the experiences of American Indian groups could provide useful data with which to test existing theories or craft new ones. Fourth, based on my own experiences to date, I offer some practical

¹ For such work from other subfields, see, e.g. (Orr 2017), Martens (2016), and Evans (2011).
² See, e.g., Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol (1985) and Byman and Pollack (2001).
recommendations for research in this field. Finally, I provide an answer to the question, “To what end?” That is, I discuss a policy agenda that further work in this area by IR scholars could help to articulate and advance—the agenda of providing more sovereignty to American Indian groups.

Before continuing to the data, I should briefly discuss the terminology I use in this paper. By “American Indian groups,” I mean the indigenous peoples of North America who settled there well before the European “discovery” of the continent. Because I am concerned in part with the study of U.S. foreign policy, I tend to focus on those groups that live(d) in what is now the continental United States. I use the parenthetical d in live(d) because I am speaking simultaneously of groups that continue to dwell in the United States as well as groups that have since ceased to exist as distinct entities. When speaking generally of such peoples, I typically refer to them as American Indian groups. When in need of a shorter modifier, I sometimes use the term “Native,” as in Native sovereignty, and I refer to the many militarized disputes between some of these groups and the U.S. as “the Indian Wars” in keeping with the historiography on the subject.3 I generally refer to distinct peoples as “groups,” “nations,” or “tribes,” the latter being used especially when necessary to distinguish between different sub-groups (or “bands”) within that group or when using the language of U.S. policy, which recognizes tribes through the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Whenever possible, however, I use language that allows me to refer to individual groups by the names by which they have become known (e.g., Seminole, Lakota,

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3 Two useful points of reference for me on this subject were Mihesuah (2005) and Gover (2017). The Indian Wars to which I refer varied widely in the extent of U.S. involvement, casualties, and expenditures, but as Grynaviski (2018: 48) notes, “Wars against Native Americans were the most common kind of conflict involving the United States. These were costly affairs, sometimes involving extra-regional powers (e.g., the War of 1812), and were a primary American security concern” for much of its history.
etc.), and I similarly prefer to make reference to specific wars (e.g., the Second Seminole War) as opposed to “the Indian Wars”.

2. Data

As noted in the introduction, this paper is inspired in part by a Perspectives on Politics symposium, the lead article of which was Kennan Ferguson’s, “Why Does Political Science Hate American Indians?” (2016). Valuable as this symposium was, I thought that a useful next step would be to do some rudimentary data collection that might help us understand just how much political science hates (or, as Ferguson suggests might be more appropriate, ignores) American Indians and to what extent that varies across subfields. As an IR scholar interested in the origins of militarized disputes between the U.S. and American Indian groups, my hunch was that other subfields—American Politics, Comparative Politics, and Political Theory, with apologies to other aspiring subfields—ignored American Indians less than IR. To put this speculative hypothesis to the test, I performed a simple form of data collection for this paper. I collected data on the number of results produced when searching for American Indian-related work on journal websites.

Table 1 below lays out the number of search results for four terms that I suspect would indicate a focus on American Indian groups—Native American, American Indian, Indigenous People(s), and Indian Affairs. In each case, I included quotation marks around the search term, but I was otherwise relatively inclusive. I counted original articles as well as book reviews, special issue contributions, and so on; the only thing I excluded, when given the opportunity, were “images,” which were typically duplicative of publications, and one result for a list of an issue’s contributors. Indigenous People(s), for which I ran searches with and without the s at the
end, is the broadest term I use and may indicate a focus on indigenous peoples other than American Indian groups. Indeed, some of the results focused instead on indigenous peoples of other regions—among them Central and South America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Xinjiang—so higher numbers here are not necessarily indicative of a substantive focus on American Indian groups. Because I wanted to focus on the subfield of International Relations, I picked three prominent subfield journals—*International Security*, *International Organization*, and *International Studies Quarterly*. (The articles found in each of these three journals are listed in the appendix.) I sought subfield journals with relatively high impact factors as well as long histories of continuous publication—each has been in print since at least 1976. In order to compare the subfield with the broader discipline, other subfields, and a different field that would more directly focus on American Indian groups as political actors, I also collected data from the *American Political Science Review*, *Comparative Political Studies*, the *Journal of Political Philosophy* (the youngest journal of the bunch having started in 1993), *American Politics Research*, and the *Western Historical Quarterly*.

In addition to counting the results for each term mentioned above, I also try to provide a sense of whether the results actually focused on American Indian groups or whether the search results were basically spurious. The final column in the table describes whether “none,” “some,” or “most” of the results were relevant. “Some” means that at least one result but fewer than half of the total were directly relevant; “most” refers to results in which more than half of the articles were relevant. The table suggests my hunch—that other subfields outperform IR in terms of their attention to American Indian groups—is correct, at least insofar as the journals I have chosen can corroborate that. These searches are clearly not capturing everything—examples such as Crawford’s 1994 article in *International Organization* attest to that—but there is no reason to
believe that results in the other journals are being suppressed any less than those in, e.g., *International Organization*. 
Table 1. Search Results on Journal Websites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>“Native American”</th>
<th>“American Indian”</th>
<th>“Indigenous People(s)”</th>
<th>“Indian Affairs”</th>
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<td>3</td>
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<td><em>ISQ</em></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Some relevant</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>APSR</em></td>
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<td>Most relevant</td>
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<td><em>CPS</em></td>
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<td><em>JPP</em></td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>APR</em></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Some relevant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>WHQ</em></td>
<td>191</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Most relevant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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These journals were founded, from top to bottom, in 1976, 1947, 1959, 1906, 1968, 1993, 1973, and 1969. For the *APSR*, one entry among the seven results for “American Indian” was duplicative of the one result for “Native American”.

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3. Indian Affairs as International Affairs

If it appears to be the case that IR scholars have done little work focusing on the experiences of American Indian groups, one might suppose that this is the case because Indian affairs is considered a “domestic” issue. But while the Bureau of Indian Affairs is in the Department of the Interior, current law is a bit more ambiguous than that, and the more distant past surely offers a view of U.S. relations with American Indian groups in which these interactions were seen as relationships with foreign, self-governing nations. There were, for example, roughly 50 conflicts involving the U.S. and American Indian groups between 1789 and 1890 that were considered serious enough to speak of them as “wars,” and one recent study estimates the total number of U.S. military engagements with American Indian groups to have been as high as 2,537 (Friedman 2015). These conflicts—not to mention subsequent veterans’ benefits—were often costly. As reported in the 1890 U.S. Census, U.S. military spending between March 4, 1789 and June 30, 1890 totaled $4,725,521,495; of this spending, the Census Bureau estimated that $807,073,658 (about 17%) was related to the Indian Wars.

From the early colonial period until well into the nineteenth century, private citizens and the U.S. government alike often spoke of and traded with Native Americans as if they were distinct nations (Schultz 1972; Saler 2015). The federal government formed treaties with

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5 I draw the rough estimate of 50 wars from government sources and from secondary sources. These sources include the following: Census Bureau (1890), Keenan (1997), McDermott (1998), and Treuer (2016). I am not concerned with whether each of the Indian Wars met the often-cited threshold of 1,000 battlefield deaths in a year; I believe it to be sufficient for this project that the belligerents involved understood themselves to be taking part in wars. In some cases, however, as in the Black Hawk War of 1832, the question of whether a given conflict could properly be called a war was debated among policy-makers. See, e.g., Calhoun (1835).

6 For these estimated expenditures, see: Census Bureau (1890, 644). The date of the last Indian War depends on what one counts as such a conflict. The Wounded Knee Massacre of 1890, which resulted in the deaths of roughly 300 Northern Lakota, is frequently described as the last major episode in the Indian Wars despite most of the casualties being non-combatants, and this is indeed the ending date I use. There were, however, intermittent skirmishes with various American Indian groups for some time after that, and the Battle of Bear Valley in 1918 was the last time U.S. Army personnel engaged a group of armed American Indians, though only one Yaqui individual was killed in this “battle” precipitated by cattle theft.
American Indian groups until 1871, and although new treaties are no longer made, the old ones are still in many cases legally binding and have necessitated U.S. payments to tribes when they have been broken (Prucha 1994). The debate over the Indian Removal Act of 1830 in the Senate was framed in part by the question of whether Native Americans were sovereign entities or not, and the Supreme Court has long been ambiguous on the exact nature of Native sovereignty (Riley 2013; Ball 2016). Congress delegated relations with American Indian groups generally to the Department of War in 1789, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) was placed in the same department when it was established in 1824; Congress only moved it to the Department of the Interior in 1849. And until 1924, Native Americans as a class were not eligible for U.S. citizenship. Relations such as this, I argue, should indeed be studied by IR scholars.

4. Where To Bring American Indian Experiences In

Even if IR scholars can claim that at least some aspects of American Indian experiences fall within their subfield’s purview, it does not necessarily follow that there is any new or useful data to be gathered here. In this section I discuss a series of issues relevant to IR scholars in which American Indian experiences could indeed provide useful data with which to bolster or challenge existing theories. First, however, I outline some brief vignettes that serve to provide examples of where such data might be found. These vignettes are focused on various Indian Wars, which should be taken as a signal of my own scholarly focus on these conflicts, not as a suggestion that early U.S. military conflicts with American Indian groups are the only aspects of

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7 See, e.g., and Deloria, Jr. and Wilkins (1999). Note that the shift away from treaty-making was largely an attempt by Congress to take power away from the President.
8 Moreover, both Secretary of War J. M. Schofield and the Indian Peace Commission, a small group established by Congress to negotiate peace treaties with western tribes, issued public reports in 1868 to recommend that the Bureau of Indian Affairs be returned to the War Department. (Prucha 2000, 72).
these relationships worth studying. I provide two relatively detailed vignettes—those on the Northwest Indian War and the Second Seminole War—as well as a collection of three more abbreviated vignettes afterwards. I then discuss four issue areas within IR on which data drawn from these and other such conflicts could shed light.

4.A. The Northwest Indian War of 1790-95

The United States began its political existence with an exceptionally small standing army—deliberations of the Continental Congress yielded a 700-man military drawn from state militias for the purpose of protecting “the northwestern frontiers of the United States, and their Indian friends and allies, and for garrisoning the posts soon to be evacuated by the troops of his britannic Majesty” (Dalton 1784). While political elites debated the virtues of the standing army, settlers were moving in droves to the territory that England had ceded to the United States in 1783, including lands that now make up Kentucky, Ohio, and Indiana (Hurt 1996, 76-80). Much of the United States’ small military was stationed in the Ohio region at that time in an effort to keep the peace between settlers and American Indian groups, but given how little the military could do, locals often responded to violence with violence of their own (Wooster 2009, 6-8). Brigadier General George Rogers Clark, for example, led an unauthorized force of mostly Kentucky militia members in a series of attacks on Shawnee towns (Prucha 1969, 8-11). As Secretary of War Henry Knox (1789) reported, “The injuries & murders have been so reciprocal, that it would be a point of critical investigation to know on which side they have been the greatest.”

U.S. political elites simultaneously codified the right of American Indians to occupy their lands (in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787) and sought to persuade American Indian groups to
sell the lands they occupied. Until the lands were sold, however, it would be necessary to prevent settler violence from undermining federal negotiations. The U.S. sought to discourage settler incursions on the lands of the Miami, Shawnee, and others, and at times the military even used their limited means to evict squatters (Tate 1999, 238-239). Congress left this task to Josiah Harmar, Lieutenant Colonel Commandant of the First American Regiment (the aforementioned 700-man force). His task, at least when he was first sent to the Northwest Territory in 1784, was to keep the peace, and he understood a prominent part of this to be the prevention of settlement in disputed territory (Sword 1985, 89). As he wrote about two-and-a-half years into his assignment, “I humbly conceive that the great objects I have to attend to, will be, to prevent illegal encroachments on the public lands, to secure happiness to the inhabitants, and to protect private property from arbitrary invasion, and to remove, if possible, diffidence, fear, & jealousy from the minds of the Indians; to these points I shall lend my attention” (Harmar 1787).

Nonetheless, after years of failed negotiations and increasing violence between Northwest Territory settlers and American Indian groups—violence fomented in part by British officials still in the Great Lakes region—President George Washington came to the conclusion that only a decisive but narrowly targeted military victory could stop the mutual depredations (Owens 2007, 16). In consultation with his Secretary of War, Henry Knox, Washington authorized Harmar to use whatever force necessary to attack those groups believed to be responsible for depredations on settlers.

4.B. The Second Seminole War

The Second Seminole War, as the name suggests, was preceded by another dispute between the U.S. and the Seminoles of Florida. For most of the eighteenth century and through at
least 1810, Florida was an “under-funded and over-hyped afterthought” to Spain and England, and it remained mostly “Indian country” until U.S. settlers took up residence and the federal government followed (Frank 2005: 26-27). By 1816, having made a name for himself in the War of 1812, then-General Andrew Jackson decided to pursue a group of escaped slaves and Seminoles living in an abandoned British fort in the Florida panhandle. Violence between settlers and Seminoles continued for months, as did Jackson’s sporadic, one-sided attacks on Seminoles, escaped slaves, and Spaniards (Mahon 1991 [1967], 23). After inconclusive fighting that served mainly to encourage Spain to sell Florida to the United States, the Second Seminole War would not begin until late 1835 as then-President Andrew Jackson pushed for the removal of American Indian groups to the west of the Mississippi River.

Jackson did not believe that American Indian groups living in U.S.-claimed territories possessed valid claims to sovereignty, and he did not believe that settlers would abide the nearby presence of rival self-governing groups. As he put it while advocating for the removal bill in 1830, “It will separate the Indians from immediate contact with settlements of whites,” which he saw as a necessary condition for both the continued existence of American Indian groups as distinct peoples and the end of settler-driven violence. Among the groups that Jackson wanted to remove was the Seminoles, in no small part due to ongoing settler petitions for the removal of the Seminoles (Monaco 2012). The War Department authorized the use of a special agent to negotiate with the Seminoles on January 30, 1832; James Gadsden would be the negotiator, and his mandate was to convince the Seminoles to move west (Mahon 1991 [1967], 74). The options Gadsden presented to the Seminoles were as follows: 1) remain in Florida and come under the

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9 The extent to which Jackson was free-lancing is debated; see Mahon (1991 [1967]): 24-28.
jurisdiction of Florida (which had become a territory of the United States in 1821; it would not become a state until 1845), or 2) emigrate west of the Mississippi to an area they would share with Creeks in what is now Oklahoma, an area that was then meant to be a perpetual “Indian Country”.

In the course of Gadsden’s meetings with Seminole leaders, seven chiefs eventually signed the Treaty of Payne’s Landing on May 9, 1832, but it was not submitted to the Senate for ratification until December of 1833 (Prucha 1994, 175-176). The Senate would take until April 8, 1834 to vote its approval, and Jackson announced four days later that the treaty would henceforth come into effect. The treaty had stipulated that the Seminoles were to move west within three years, but the language was ambiguous—it was not clear whether that was to be three years from the date of the chiefs’ signing or from the date of its approval by the Senate and the President (Mahon 1991 [1967], 75-79). American officials, including Indian Agent Wiley Thompson (appointed to the position in August 1833) and Attorney General Benjamin Franklin Butler, made the case for the former, giving the Seminoles until May of 1835 to begin their emigration (Butler 1835).

Perhaps more importantly, however, those chiefs who signed the treaty were not representative of all Seminoles in Florida, and there is some dispute as to whether U.S. negotiators and translators accurately relayed the terms of the treaty. The Seminoles, even those who still accepted the treaty by that point, believed that they should have until 1837. Thompson met with Seminole chiefs in late October of 1834 to impress upon them that, “The question was not whether they wanted to remove or stay, but how removal was to be achieved,” and he reiterated this stance in their next meeting as well (Mahon 1991 [1967], 91-92). The War Department eventually sent ten companies of troops to Florida, and the remaining Seminoles
were given a January 1836 deadline to report to the Tampa Bay area for removal. At this point, in late December of 1835, a Seminole group struck American soldiers first, and the long, costly war would continue until 1842 (Hahn 2016, 35).

4.C. Other Indian Wars

Here I even more briefly describe events leading up to three more of the Indian Wars, including Tecumseh’s War, the Black Hawk War of 1832, and the Cayuse War. In the case of Tecumseh’s War (so named after the Shawnee leader), a division emerged among American Indians of the Northwest Territory (which by then had been broken into smaller states, including Ohio, and territories, such as Indiana and Michigan). Some sought to accommodate U.S. settlers and adopt some of their cultural practices for the sake of peace. Others, including Tecumseh’s brother, Tenskwatawa, began to articulate anti-assimilationist arguments focusing especially on the preservation of Native religious practices (Saler 2015, 79-81). As other nearby groups began to sell lands or otherwise provide U.S. persons with settlement rights, Tecumseh sought allies, especially with members of tribes that had fought against the United States in the Northwest Indian War. The eventual military confrontation would cost Tecumseh his life, and the loose confederation he built would not survive his loss either.

Years later, the Black Hawk War of 1832 would be fought a bit farther west—in the territories of Illinois and Michigan. In this case, a Sauk leader by the name of Black Hawk would rally a group of predominantly Sauk and Fox individuals in opposition to a disputed land cession treaty that had been signed in 1804. It is not clear whether the earlier Sauk and Fox leaders had the authority to sign away the lands discussed in the treaty, nor is it clear whether they fully understood the terms of the treaty. Black Hawk would indeed claim that the land purportedly
ceded to the United States had not been legally surrendered, and hostilities—including occasional killings—provoked in part by settlers would lead the U.S. to send the military to force a resolution to the situation. When Black Hawk sent a small group of men (literally carrying a white flag) to seek negotiations with U.S. military personnel, however, American soldiers (likely volunteers as opposed to enlisted men) mistook their approach for a display of hostility and fired on the men (Prucha 1969, 211-23). This escalated the matter from the prior infrequent, low-level violence to a war.

Finally, the Cayuse War of 1847-55 took place in Oregon Territory, and while low-level violence between the Cayuse and settlers persisted for several years, the initial spark appears to have been a genuine misunderstanding (Ruby and Brown 1972, 105-112). Specifically, Marcus and Narcissa Whitman went as missionaries to Oregon, and they preached to the Cayuse and other American Indian groups in the area where they settled. The Whitmans were not the first settlers in the area, but they were relatively early among those who took this trail. The Whitmans had little luck in converting the Cayuse, who reportedly remained suspicious of the culturally alien missionaries. When larger groups of settlers started to arrive in Oregon in the late 1840s, the Cayuse suffered from widespread outbreaks of diseases that may have killed up to half the population. Marcus Whitman, both a missionary and a physician, was assumed by some to be responsible for having cast diseases on those who had been unwilling to convert (Keenan 1997, 249). The war began when a group of Cayuse attacked and killed the Whitmans in their home and a local militia was raised for a reprisal.

4.D. The Public and Foreign Policy
The role of the public in foreign policy—in the United States, in democracies, and in general—is the subject of much research in political science. The vignettes that describe the origins of the Northwest Indian War and the Second Seminole War should draw our attention to the ways in which non-official, non-elite U.S. citizens have directly influenced the course of U.S. foreign policy. While elites appeared to prefer to avoid war with American Indian groups in the Northwest Territory, an aggressive, land-hungry public was able to force the hand of political elites and eventually received military intervention on its behalf. Similarly, settlers advancing into a Florida over which Spain exercised little control brought the federal government behind them as Seminoles sought to resist incursions on to their territory. There may be fewer opportunities for regular citizens to provoke militarized disputes today, but the frequency of settler violence and subsequent federal intervention suggests that we ought to use the available data to rethink two common assumptions: 1) that it is political elites who initiate militarized disputes, whereas citizens simply support or resist elite conflict initiation and 2) that the public, especially in a democracy, generally acts as a constraint on elites who would otherwise initiate militarized disputes more frequently. At the very least, the extent to which these assumptions can travel across time and space may be more limited than we think.

4.E. Arms and Conflict Propensity

The U.S. experience in the Northwest Indian War similarly speaks to a long-running debate—does possession of a large standing army (or, rather, a disproportionately high

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11 See, e.g., Baum and Potter (2015) for a notable example thereof as well as for a capable review of such work.
12 Relatedly, recent literature has examined the fait accompli and the way states use it in world politics; further study is warranted to determine whether citizens were deliberately using faits accomplis to pressure elites into intervening on their behalf. See Tarar (2016) and Altman (2017).
percentage of a state’s spending on arms) make a state more or less likely to engage in militarized conflict? Individuals of differing ideological stripes—most frequently left-leaning writers and self-described libertarians—have made arguments to the effect that militarization makes conflict more likely.13 “When all you have is a hammer,” as the saying goes, “every problem looks like a nail.” In more conservative circles, the Reagan-era slogan “peace through strength” is still quoted today.14 There is some evidence to suggest that militarization does indeed make states more likely to go to war (Schofield 2007). Recent research on an analogous issue—the militarization of U.S. policing—similarly suggests that more militarized police cause more civilian deaths (Lawson 2018). But the case of the Northwest Indian War especially draws our attention to the possibility that the absence of a larger standing army may have allowed for settler-initiated conflict, which subsequently spiraled into a wider war. The United States could not adequately police its citizens and thereby became embroiled in a conflict it did not seek. This case suggests that the relationship between a state’s degree of militarization and its propensity to initiate militarized disputes is not as linear as we might expect.

4.F. War Initiation: Accidents and Bargains

The question of whether war can ever be truly accidental occasionally arises in scholarly circles, and it has recently done so once more largely due to U.S. relations with North Korea, albeit more through informal exchanges and social media than in academic journals. The frequent refrain here is that accidental war is extremely rare or simply does not happen.15 But the

13 See, e.g., Friedman (2016) and Quiggin (2016).
14 For a discussion of these points that tends to align with the “militarization leads to war” theory, see, e.g., Bacevich (2008).
15 For example, Michael C. Horowitz makes this case on Twitter (https://twitter.com/mchorowitz/status/948681589059301376), as does Daniel W. Altman, who provides a useful literature review in less than 280 characters: “What accidental wars? I’ve looked across modern history.
Black Hawk War and the Cayuse War should demonstrate that accidental war may occur more frequently than we think. In the Black Hawk War, one side appears to have mistaken the other’s approach to seek negotiations for an imminent attack. It is possible that recorded history is missing relevant facts that would establish this first skirmish as a more intentional act of hostility, but at present, this war, brief as it may have been, seems to have been accidental. Likewise, the Cayuse War may have started with the entirely intentional killing of the Whitmans, but this was, to the Cayuse, not so much an initiation as a reprisal. Illness was not, as far as we know, deliberately spread to them by settlers, but they believed that it had been, and they retaliated. Those who argue that accidental wars do not happen should perhaps look to the Indian Wars for data that would challenge their claims; perhaps by doing so we could learn more about the conditions under which accidental wars do or do not happen.

As for bargaining, the initiation of the Second Seminole War in particular should demonstrate that an explanation for war that relies on the assumption that two or more parties engage in good-faith bargaining prior to war—or that they should engage in such bargaining to try to avoid war given its costs—will not be universally applicable. In this case, one party refused to bargain in good faith due to Andrew Jackson’s belief that the Seminoles and other Native Americans were irremediably uncivilized and therefore lacking in any credible claim to sovereignty. The bargaining model of war assumes that, “There always exists a set of negotiated settlements that both sides prefer to fighting” (Fearon 1995, 387). Negotiated is the key word here. If one actor does not believe that the other ought to be bargained with—that doing so would offer the other side a privilege that ought not to be accorded to it—I would describe the cause of

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Steve Van Evera has looked. Dan Reiter has looked. Others have looked. Damned hard to find any” (https://twitter.com/daltman_IR/status/952246020737466370). Gideon Rose makes the same argument in a recent podcast interview with Ryan Evans: https://player.fm/series/war-on-the-rocks-1518185/two-editors-go-nuclear-on-each-other-a-conversation-with-gideon-rose.
that war more as a refusal to bargain than as a bargaining failure. This process is, I think, evident in the Second Seminole War, and it may also be the case elsewhere that there are some actors who will have a preference only for non-negotiated (i.e., imposed) settlements to avoid war. U.S. demands of American Indian groups that, one way or another, would end a given group’s existence as a self-governing entity would surely qualify and would complicate our understanding of bargaining processes.

4.G. Balancing and Bandwagoning

One of the oddities of Tecumseh’s War, at least from the perspective of the modern IR scholar, is that Tecumseh and his brother were unable to get any more support from other tribes. Surely, there were obstacles to such alliance formation—not least historical rivalries and technological limits on individual tribes’ abilities to assess the capabilities and intentions of an expanding United States. But given what would seem to be an existential threat, more research is warranted on alliance formation (or the lack thereof) in this crucial period for American Indian groups—some groups saw increasing U.S. power as an imminent, existential threat worth fighting, but not all did. What explains this variation?

It is separately worth noting that the original impetus for Tecumseh’s War came when Tecumseh’s brother, who became widely known as The Prophet, initiated a religious movement premised in part on an anti-assimilationist view toward the U.S. Balancing and bandwagoning in modern IR literature tends to be described in military terms (Parent and Rosato 2015). But when we survey the historical record for instances of balancing or bandwagoning, we should perhaps be looking beyond specifically military actions and toward, e.g., prophecies, conversions, and the like. Religious movements such as The Prophet’s were often seen as a threat by the United
States. On the other hand, promises to convert to one form or another of Christianity often sufficed to assuage policy-makers of any such concerns and even to win alliances, both with the United States and with earlier colonial powers such as Spain. Indeed, Apaches swore to join Spanish missions if the Spaniards would help to defend them against Comanches (Hämäläinen 2008, 36). In short, we could likely learn much from further study of the patterns of balancing and bandwagoning displayed by American Indian groups over time.

5. Practical Considerations for Future Research

Given that there is very little work focusing on American Indian groups in International Relations and that I have just spent several pages outlining what I believe would be fruitful avenues for research, I now turn to some things that those undertaking such research ought to keep in mind—obstacles or issues that one may not encounter while working on other IR topics.

First, there is the necessity of venturing outside of Political Science. Given how little education many Americans receive on the varied Native populations that inhabit(ed) what is now the United States, many individuals will enter graduate training in Political Science without having extensive knowledge of the histories of American Indian groups and U.S. relations with them. For me and, I would expect, for many others studying this area, it takes time to gain an adequate grasp of the relevant historical facts. Moreover, given that doctoral students are socialized into the discipline by other political scientists, one will not immediately know where to find the best work being done by historians and Indigenous Studies scholars. As opposed to, say, Cornell University Press and Princeton University Press, both of which publish a great deal of work in IR and on international security more specifically, those studying American Indian

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16 See, e.g., later fears surrounding the so-called Ghost Dance (Blackhawk 2006, 270).
histories would want to look at the catalogues of presses they otherwise would not think to examine—e.g., those from the University of Nebraska Press, the University of Oklahoma Press, and the University of Arizona Press. For resources on specific groups or events—such as those focused on the Seminoles of Florida—university presses from that state will likely have useful offerings (as does the University Press of Florida in this case). Like learning the history itself, it takes time to learn how to operate outside of one’s usual field of study.

Second, research on American Indian groups—even if it is purely historical work involving no contact with human subjects—should be treated as work involving a sensitive population. Given the marginalization of these peoples in the U.S. political system, it is worth the effort to, first and foremost, determine whether your research could be used to justify further marginalization of those populations and to scrutinize both your research design and your language accordingly.17 Furthermore, researchers should go out of their way to make connections with individuals in the communities about which they are writing (i.e., beyond the archivists). Discussing one’s research with current tribe members can be an invaluable source of feedback both on the research itself and on the way in which you are presenting the research.

Third, many tribes have little in the way of written histories extending farther back than the twentieth century, and for those that do, it is even rarer for these histories to be recorded in English. This can make it especially difficult to acquire evidence that would help to adjudicate between hypothesized explanations for political phenomena of interest, and it often means that scholars will ultimately use more resources produced by the U.S. government than by Native tribes or individuals. If we are to take American Indian experiences seriously, however, we also need to take seriously the obligation not to unduly privilege records created by individuals with a

17 See footnote 5 as well as the following research resources collected by the National Congress of American Indians’ Policy Research Center: http://www.ncai.org/policy-research-center/initiatives/research-regulation.
vested interest in the diminution of Native power. To the extent possible, therefore, scholars interested in this subject ought to make use of sources produced by American Indian groups and by non-official U.S. persons while also being critical of U.S. government sources that purport to present the whole truth.

Here the aforementioned work of historians can be especially useful—in many cases, they have already spent the requisite time in the archives and can shed light on the views and intentions of the politicians we political scientists also study. When it comes to sources produced by American Indian groups, oral histories can be a useful source against which official accounts can be compared. In some cases, as with the Seminole of Florida, interviews with tribe members have been recorded and maintained in centralized museums or archives (more on this particular institution below). As for non-official U.S. sources, I am thinking especially of newspapers and the personal papers of U.S. settlers, many of which are preserved in state, county, or city archives and historical societies, of which there are many. The surest (perhaps obvious) way to identify such sources before actually undertaking research is to inquire exhaustively with any and all archivists at such institutions who will know the status of the historical record and who will know where to point a researcher if they lack relevant materials.

Fourth and finally, while research conducted in the continental United States can be more feasible for graduate students than travel abroad, the costs of travel required to conduct field work can nonetheless be prohibitive given the rural locations of many reservations and other Native institutions. For my ongoing dissertation field work for example, I conducted archival research at the Ah-Tah-Thi-Ki Museum on the Big Cypress Seminole Reservation in Florida. To get there from Washington, D.C., I flew into Ft. Lauderdale, but I then had to rent a car to drive about an hour-and-a-half into the Everglades. Adding up the costs of even a short research trip—
in this case, a stay in Clewiston, Florida for four days—quickly gets expensive, especially when taking into account the photography equipment and digital storage necessary for some archival work. I was lucky to receive sufficient financial support from the Department of Government at Georgetown University to make this trip feasible, and other scholars may similarly find ways to procure the necessary funding. But in other cases—for example, as with Buffalo Bill Center of the West in Cody, Wyoming—I have instead ordered scanned or printed photocopies of relevant records rather than making trips to all the potentially relevant locations. This latter option is, I think, a second-best option when compared to physically going to a museum, archive, or reservation, which allows for greater spontaneity and relationship-building with staffers, but for graduate students especially, ordering copies be the most cost-effective option.

5. Toward a Progressive Indian Policy

I suggest that IR scholars pay greater attention to the experiences of American Indian groups not solely for the ways in which this could inform our understanding of world politics. Rather, I believe that doing so can help to better articulate and advance worthwhile, concrete political objectives—in the most general sense, I mean the goal of strengthening Native sovereignty and self-determination. In today’s U.S. political landscape, I believe that political goals of this sort would be most welcome on the political left and, indeed, might make the most sense as part of a broader package of “progressive” policies. A strategy to enhance Native self-determination could also have some limited purchase on the political right—conservative writers occasionally find receptive audiences among their co-partisans when framing Indian affairs reforms as part of reducing the reach of the federal government. But because it seems unlikely

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18 See, for example, the reception of Naomi Schafer Riley’s 2016 book, which was reviewed in the pages of The National Review and debated in the halls of the American Enterprise Institute. In the words of one
that sizeable portions of today’s Republican elites would prioritize such efforts. I focus on situating this argument within the recently boom of writing on the formation of a progressive foreign policy.

My contribution to this ongoing conversation is to suggest that progressives could reframe “Indian affairs” as an issue that is not inherently “domestic” and that American Indian groups themselves should be given the opportunity to become truly sovereign nation-states. If this once-foreign policy became seen by most as part of domestic policy, the reverse can occur as well. If the United can recognize San Marino as an independent state, it can do the same for Navajo Nation. There may well be some federally recognized tribes that would prefer to maintain the legal status quo while making improvements where possible—e.g., on Native voting rights or on funding for the Indian Health Service, both of which a progressive Indian policy should be responsive to as well. But a progressive Indian policy, I argue, should have as its ultimate and underlying goal the creation of path to independent statehood for federally recognized tribes.

What might this entail? What would the federal government need to do? The answer, in short, is a lot of legislative work. But to offer some brief ideas, the creation of independent Native states should be accompanied by the establishment an office in the State Department to

reviewer, the book “relies upon non-Indian free-market advocates and anti-government think tanks. She uses this one-sided approach to develop a theory that the best thing for Indian people is to dismember their governments and liquidate their reservation and trust lands. Only then, she writes, will Indian people benefit from the ‘magical force’ of private property. These 19th-century assimilationist ideas would terminate Indian tribes, destroying what little is left of Indian country” (Fletcher 2016). One hopes that a less assimilationist policy could also find supporters on the right. On the book’s reception among conservatives, see: http://www.acei.org/events/how-federal-policy-affects-native-americans-naomi-schafer-riley-on-her-book-the-new-trail-of-tears-how-washington-is-destroying-american-indians/ and https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2016/08/29/naomi-schafer-riley-the-new-trail-of-tears/.

19 As to why this seems unlikely, see, e.g., Turkewitz (2017) and Fox (2018).
20 For a small sampling of such work, see, e.g., Nexon (2018), Jones (2018), and Goldgeier and Kirshner (2016).
handle relations with any American Indian tribes that prefer independence. Such an office could offer diplomatic recognition, handle citizenship and passport-related issues, and encourage other states and institutions to offer recognition as well. It would be most logical, I believe, to assign this new portfolio to the Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs or to a newly created Assistant Secretary working under the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Any given tribe’s decision to become independent, moreover, ought to come with only very limited conditions from the U.S. government—the primary one being prior federal recognition of the tribe(s) in question. Such independence should not, however, be conditional on, e.g., maintaining a certain form of government or property management, and it should come with the guarantee that any tribes that seek independence can later renounce that status if they so choose and return to their prior relationship with the federal government. The more important guarantee, I imagine, would be U.S. promises to continue to respect treaty rights with groups that opt for independence and to provide the same sort of financial and technical assistance that has been provided mainly through the Bureau of Indian Affairs to date. This could surely be administered in much the same way that it is now, or it could be reclassified and administered as foreign aid where appropriate. Given the political unpopularity of “foreign aid,” however, it might be politically wise to keep such financing under the purview of the BIA in the Department of the Interior.

I imagine some opponents of such policies would suggest that this would unnecessarily and unwisely give up U.S. claims to land it desires and to people that can pay it taxes. Might such a policy even endanger the Union by encouraging small secessionist movements that still exist through the United States? I would offer multiple rebuttals to these concerns. First, any such policy in favor of Native statehood could still allow for close economic ties between the U.S. and newly independent American Indian groups. This could be a “special relationship” of a
different sort, one in which Native individuals retain the option of U.S. citizenship, service in the U.S. military, and so on. Moreover, if American Indian groups currently contract with U.S. businesses, it is unlikely that this would change after independence, especially if restrictions on the transportation of goods and people between the U.S. and these new states could be relaxed in much the same way European Union member states have previously done. There would simply be little long-run economic cost to the United States and perhaps even less cost in terms of security threats emerging from such a change. As to the encouragement of U.S. secessionist movements, I suspect that progressive politicians would have a relatively easy time explaining why Native nations—truly distinct peoples that existed as such before the existence of the United States—differ from, say, rural California or Oregon Republicans who simply want to secede or create a new state because of the current partisan make-up of their state.

As noted previously, much of the work to craft a pathway to statehood for American Indian groups would need to be done by the legislature with the approval of the executive. Current responsibilities for Indian Affairs are largely enshrined in statute and would thus require revisions to statutes. The positive side to this is that changing statutes is easier than amending the Constitution. But even such statutory changes of this sort are not going to happen in the current Congress, nor are they likely to happen in the next one. That said, the political situation will change in time, for better or for worse. The partisan composition of each chamber will change, as will the party of the executive, and new issues can become salient in time. The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, perhaps the single most important piece of U.S. legislation in preserving some degree of Native sovereignty, would scarcely have been imaginable to most in the years leading up to it (Pevar 2012, 8-11). Nonetheless, this legislation was enacted after elections in 1932 produced a very favorable legislative environment for the newly elected
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and in part due to policy entrepreneurship among a small group of people who had started exploring ideas for reforms in the 1920s, one of whom, John Collier, happened to become Roosevelt’s Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1933. Using the centennial of this legislation—the year 2034—as a focal point around which policy advocates could rally for further enhancements to Native sovereignty may be the most politically viable path toward a more progressive Indian policy.
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Appendix

This supplemental appendix includes a list of publications that from the three IR subfield journals that were included in my search results for four different terms. For the sake of brevity, I omit the list of articles from the other journals listed in Table 1.

International Security

- “Native American”

- “American Indian”

- “Indigenous People(s)”

- “Indian Affairs”
  - [No results]

International Organization

- “Native American”
  - [No results]

- “American Indian”

- “Indigenous People(s)”
  - [No results]

- “Indian Affairs”
  - [No results]

International Studies Quarterly

- “Native American”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Volume, Number, Year</th>
<th>Pages</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mapping a New World: Geography and the Interwar Study of International Relations</td>
<td>Lucian M. Ashworth</td>
<td>57, No. 1 (2013)</td>
<td>138-149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the Size and Shape of African States</td>
<td>Elliott Green</td>
<td>56, No. 2 (2012)</td>
<td>229-244</td>
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<td>American Indian</td>
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<td>Wartime Sexual Violence in Guatemala and Peru</td>
<td>Michele L. Leiby</td>
<td>53, No. 2 (2009)</td>
<td>445-468</td>
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<tr>
<td>Singularity or Aberration? A Response to Buzan and Lawson</td>
<td>Paul Musgrave and Daniel H. Nexon</td>
<td>57, No. 3 (2013)</td>
<td>637-639</td>
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<td>Modernization vs. Dependency Revisited: Effects of Foreign Direct Investment on Food Security in Less Developed Countries</td>
<td>Andreea Mihalache-O’keef and Quan Li</td>
<td>55, No. 1 (2011)</td>
<td>71-93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Inequalities and Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>Gudrun Østby, Ragnhild Nordås, and Jan Ketil Rød</td>
<td>53, No. 2 (2009)</td>
<td>301-324</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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- “Indian Affairs”
  - [No results]
Research agendas are not set in concrete; they naturally change over time as your knowledge grows and as new research questions emerge. Don’t be intimidated. Many students may start a graduate program with only a few ideas of areas they would like to study, or perhaps a few general research questions. Then pick courses to help you in reaching this goal. Try to use class assignments to advance your research agenda. If possible, use each seminar paper as a way to focus on a specific part of your overall agenda — whether it be a literature review or a proposal for a study. Don’t be afraid to take a chance on a course that seems somewhat outside of your agenda or your comfort zone.