Managerialism and the continuing project of state reform

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INTRODUCTION

We are writing this chapter in a period following the banking crisis of 2008 and the subsequent attempts by North Atlantic nation states to introduce austerity measures, rolling back or further retreating from expansive notions of state responsibility for providing welfare benefits and public services. In trying to make sense of what is going on – politically as well as analytically – we begin by looking back to our account of what happened, in Britain, following the economic crisis of the 1970s. This crisis was precipitated by a steep rise in oil prices in many western nations, and resulted in a profound reordering of economy and society marked by the rise of New Right politics (embodied in Thatcherism in the UK; Reagan and the reinvented Republican Party in the USA). We do not, in this paper, want to argue that current situation is merely a matter of history repeating itself. On the contrary, global configurations of power and resources are aligned very differently, and many western governments had been engaged in programmes of restructuring and modernisation long before the current financial crisis and recession hit. But we do want to revisit some of the forms of analysis we developed in the 1990s (The Managerial State: Clarke and Newman, 1997) and the 2000s (Publics, Politics and Power: Newman and Clarke, 2009) in order to explore what resources they might offer for analysing the current political conjuncture.

We coined the term ‘the managerial state’ in an attempt to give a name to the processes of cultural and political transformation that were taking place in Britain in the 1980s and 1990s under the premierships of Margaret Thatcher (1979-1992) and John Major (1992-1997). Our focus was on Britain, but the transformations introduced by Reagan in the US and in New Zealand in the 1980s followed similar logics (drawing on the ‘neo-liberal’ experiment of Pinochet’s Chile in the 1970s). The shared assumptions of ‘liberating’ market forces from state controls; ‘liberating’ the consumer from the burdens of taxation; and reducing the size, scope and cost of the state informed a whole range of national governments and international organisations through this period: often being conceptualized as neo-liberalism or neo-liberalization (see, for example, Harvey, 2005; Peck, 2010). Indeed, what we (following Pollitt,
1993) called managerialism – or what was more conventionally termed the New Public Management (NPM) – became a key element of this global, and globalising, logic that informed many national reform programmes and was promulgated by transnational bodies such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other development agencies (Hood, 1995; Kaboolian, 1998).

We will return to the NPM later, but here want to note that our analysis was not just concerned with a set of new techniques technologies (purchaser-provider splits, principal-agent models, contracting and so on) but with deeper processes of social, cultural and political change. We spoke about a managerial state because we wanted to locate managerialism as a cultural formation and a distinctive set of ideologies and practices that formed one of the underpinnings of the new political settlement that we saw emerging. The Thatcherite period, sustained by an unstable mixture of neo-conservative ideology and Hayekian economic theory, can be seen as a response to what was commonly understood as an economic and political crisis: the combination of economic recession and the exhaustion of a previous Labour government. This combination was viewed as dismantling the previous political-economic settlement between capital and labour that had been institutionalised in the Keynesian welfare state. But the focus on the political and economic settlement, we argued, tended to overlook the social settlement inscribed in the welfare state and the organisational settlement that was fundamental to its realisation. As such it offered too limited an understanding of the dismantling of a particular political conjuncture in which social and cultural dimensions were displaced by a narrow focus on the political and economic (for a rather different reading of the British crisis and the conjuncture of the mid-1970s, see Hall et al., 1978)

This is, of course, a very British story and it is important not to take the UK as the norm or even model for developments elsewhere. Nevertheless, we think it important to pay attention to the particularities of such ‘national’ stories, even while paying attention to the ways in which they may be entangled in international and transnational networks of exchange, imitation, and coercive transfer of policy and governance models. Attention to such specificities confounds narratives of the universality of the New Public Management (NPM) as a global and globalising phenomenon:

The NPM often features as a core element in theories of convergence between states, theories that tend to override their distinct cultural and
political characteristics. The nature of change in specific nations cannot be understood simply in terms of global forces and transnational economic retrenchment. Nor can it be read as the local effect of a set of global ideas about how to run public services (Clarke and Newman, 1997: xi).

There have been many accounts of the specificity of modernising and managerialising reforms in different countries and regions (e.g., Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011; Pollitt and Dan, 2011; Samaratunge et al., 2008) There is no doubt that managerialism became something of a global template for reform against which notions of the ‘development’ or ‘underdevelopment’ of states were assessed, and which fuelled an extensive market for the importation of skills and models from the UK, the US and New Zealand, and for the expansion of management consultancies who packaged business models and reform templates and peddled them across national borders. Indeed, in this sense, the dynamics of globalisation and managerialisation seem intimately connected, but neither can be understood as universal or uniform processes.

So, we do not subscribe to the idea of a ‘convergence’ of nation states around a single model, not least because both the nature of reforms and their periodisation cannot be confined to a focus on administrative systems and the impact of NPM. As we argued in the case of Britain, the development and subsequent dislocation of the social and organisational settlements underpinning the formation of welfare states was also significant. As we argued in 1997:

The social settlement, formed in the intersection of ‘family, work and nation’, had proved no more stable than its economic and political counterparts. The interplay of social changes – in the make-up of households, workers and the people – and new forms of social, cultural and political movements destabilised the social settlement profoundly. Particular lines of social differentiation became a focus for collective action and political conflict. Many of these centred on divisions which had previously been treated as natural categories (such as ‘race’, gender and sexuality) where collective action sought to redefine them as socially produced and constructed.

… these challenges also called into question the nature of the welfare state’s neutrality as embodied in its bureau-professional organisational regimes… Instead of neutrality, both the formal and informal rules of bureaucracies and
the practices of professionalism were revealed as contributing to the production and reproduction of power and inequality. Policy formation and implementation, employment practices and the characteristic organisational cultures of welfare institutions were all implicated… the crisis of the social penetrated deeply into the organisational and occupational worlds of the ‘old’ welfare state. (1997: 9-12)

Reflecting very different sorts of settlements – and challenges to them, in the case of Brazil, Sonia Fleury (2011) traces how the ‘elitist’ social insurance model in Brazil was challenged by a more universal model in the late 1980s, driven by popular demands for social rights, decentralisation and social participation. The resulting welfare system emerged precisely – and paradoxically – at the point when questions were being raised about the sustainability of many European welfare states (see also Gledhill and Hita, 2011, on later developments). In addition, the process of building welfare institutions in Brazil was limited by severely restrictive economic and political constraints of the 1980s that were not present in the 1960s and early 1970s in Western Europe and the US. However, its strong basis in the demands and claims of social movements and political actors generated transformations in administrative processes and strong democratic participatory mechanisms. The contradictions opened up generated very different dynamics from those we describe in this paper; in the UK, moves towards both administrative transformation and public participation were largely driven by governmental and political projects ‘from above’ which sought to both incorporate and pre-empt political conflict and dissent (Steinberg and Johnson, 2004; Newman, 2001; Newman and Clarke 2009).

Later in this paper we will reflect on how such projects drew on critiques of managerialism while elaborating new governing logics that privileged the further expansion of both corporate power and managerial authority into the provision of public services. We will also consider the current period of crisis and austerity politics, examining the cultural and political projects that seek to ‘unsettle’ and ‘resettle’ contemporary social formations. Such projects are dynamic and unfinished, and take different forms in different nations and regions. This is not, we argue, simply a matter of a global neo-liberalism sweeping all before it, but of profoundly political projects that seek to realign forms of power in economic, political and social relations (Clarke, 2008). But before engaging with the analysis of the present we want to set out in a little more detail our theoretical approach. In section 1 we trace further the contours of ‘the managerial state’, paying particular attention to the ideology of
managerialism and the construction of the ‘dispersed’ form of the state; while in section 2 we trace something of its implications for the reform of education systems. In section 3 we go on to explore how the contours of the managerial state developed and changed in subsequent decades. Finally, in section 4, we consider how this approach might inform an analysis of the current conjuncture – and how it might need to be developed to address the changing situation.

1. CONTOURS OF THE MANAGERIAL STATE

Programmes of welfare reform have tended to be buttressed and legitimated by narratives about the economic necessity of change, especially in times of apparent fiscal crisis. But we have already pointed to the significance of culture and ideology in processes of state reform and retrenchment. In Britain the economic crisis facing many western nations in the mid-1970s generated an intense focus on the costs of public spending, and led to attempts to redraw the post-war Fordist/welfarist settlement in ways that might enhance the profitability of capital (Jessop, 2002). This was accompanied by moves to cut taxation, to free up labour markets and to remove some of the ‘burdens’ of state regulation and state intervention in the free working of markets. Such moves sought to break up and redraw the political-economic settlement between capital and labour, whether that inscribed in the welfare state itself or in the traditions of tripartite wage negotiations between unions, employers and the state. What followed included a new emphasis on market-centric approaches, with a turn to contractualisation, purchaser-provider splits and internal or quasi-markets; an emerging ‘mixed economy’ of service provision and funding; a complex process of labour force restructuring and deregulation; and a subsequent rhetorical privileging of the customer or consumer of public services (Clarke et al., 2007). These shifts were supported by both an ideological belief in the power of management to bring about transformative change and the dispersal of state power to a cadre of ‘empowered’ managerial agents. We now examine each of these developments in a little more detail.

Managerialism and managerialisation

Managerialism as an ideology was central to the reform process of the 1980s and 1990s in the UK in that it enabled a translation of a private sector business ethos into the state and public sector. It follows that even where public services were not fully privatised (and many remained in the public sector), they were required to perform
as if they were in a competitive marketplace. They were required to become ‘business-like’ and this ethos was seen as embodied in the figure of the manager (as opposed to the politician, the professional or the administrator). This introduced new logics of decision-making that privileged economy and efficiency over other public values. In The Managerial State we describe this process in terms of the shaping of a new organisational settlement that displaced – in part – the bureau-professional regimes of the traditional welfare state. We borrowed the idea of Professional bureaucracy from Mintzberg (1983) and it describes the uneven (and sometimes unstable) mix of professional and bureaucratic power that had been characteristic of organisations delivering health, education and other public services.

Managers represented a counterpoint to bureau-professionalism because they were imagined to inhabit the world of market action and were the natural carriers of its entrepreneurialism and dynamism. They could provide the full gamut of ‘good business practices’ that organisations in the public sector needed to learn. This imagery of management was often concerned with old-fashioned virtues of organisational coordination: the ‘hard-headed’ control of costs in the pursuit of greater efficiency, not least through intensified labour productivity (Mohan, 1995, chapter 6). But it also drew on the more dynamic celebration of the manager-as-hero being articulated in the ‘new’ managerialism, particularly in those new conceptions of the manager as leader and corporate culture shaper, inspiring the unending pursuit of quality and excellence (Clarke and Newman, 1993; Pollitt, 1993, and Flynn, 1994). Both old and new versions of managerialism, however, centred on one essential precondition for ‘transforming’ the dull professional bureaucracies of social welfare into modern organisations - the establishment or enlargement of ‘the right to manage’. Such legitimations of the ‘natural’ desirability of management as the obvious way of running organisations were reflected in the increasing use of the phrase ‘well managed’ to describe successful organisations. They were also sustained by contrasts drawn between management and the forms of organisational coordination associated with the old welfare state. The virtues of managers were compared with the failings of bureaucrats, professionals and politicians. So, where bureaucrats were rule bound, inward looking and inert; managers were innovative, externally oriented and dynamic. Where professionals were paternalistic and developed mystiques of expertise to conceal and protect their power and were self-regulating; managers were customer centred, created transparent organisations and were tested in the ‘real world’ of the market place. Finally, where politicians were dogmatic, interfering and changeable; managers were realists, capable of taking a strategic view and, as long
as they were given the ‘freedom to manage’, were able to deliver on the promise that they
would ‘do the right thing’.

The reconstruction of the state involved both managerialism and managerialisation.
Managerialism is an ideology that legitimated claims to power, especially the ‘right to
manage’, constructed as necessary to achieve greater efficiency in pursuing
organisational and social objectives (see also Pollitt, 1993, chapter 1). Secondly,
managerialism is a calculative framework that organises knowledge about organisational
goals and the means of achieving them. It is usually structured around an internal
calculus of efficiency (inputs-outputs) and an external calculus of competitive positioning
within a field of market relations. However, managerialism is also a series of overlapping
discourses which articulate different - even conflicting - propositions about how to
manage and what is to be managed. So different forms of managerialism focus on
‘leadership’ ‘strategy’, ‘quality’ and so on to produce a complex and shifting field of
managerial knowledge (see, inter alia, Flynn, 1994; Pollitt, 1993; O’Reilly and Reed,
2010).

Managerialisation is a process of establishing managerial authority over corporate
resources (whether these are material, human or symbolic) and corporate decision-
making. Secondly managerialisation is a process of establishing the calculative
frameworks of managerialism. These define the terms and conditions of decision-making.
The objective of managerialisation is to embed these frameworks as the forms of
knowledge that govern patterns of internal and external relationships. Finally,
managerialisation is a process of creating forms of ‘managing’ and types of managers.
We identified three main forms of ‘managing’ that were visible in the restructuring of public
services in the UK during the 1980s and 1990s: ‘real managers’; ‘hybrids’; and a
‘dispersed managerial consciousness’. The most obvious indicator of the impact of
managerialism in public services was the rapid growth in the number of people who are
employed as ‘managers’: that is, they occupied posts explicitly defined as ‘management’.
These managers were either ‘imports’ or ‘converts’: the former brought in from elsewhere;
the latter manufactured ‘in-house’ through management training or development
programmes and making a career shift to a clearly identified managerial role (in a context
where organisational careers were increasingly becoming defined in managerial rather
than professional terms). Although such numbers may be the most obvious indicator of
managerialisation, the other two forms of managing may be of equal importance. The
‘hybrid’ form became widespread in what were formerly bureau-professional
organisations providing public services. ‘Hybrid’ is a convenient way of describing the
complex processes of incorporating professional workers into managerised roles, characteristically through processes of devolution and delegation (see Ferlie et al., 1996). Clinical directors, ward managers and fund-holding practices in the NHS; head teachers under Local Management of Schools; care management in personal social services; devolved operational management in policing all rested on the construction of articulations between professional and managerial modes of coordination. Such ‘hybrids’ evoked a complex of motivations. On the one hand, they mobilised ‘service values’ or professional commitments to motivate the engagement with corporate management. At the same time, they required that these commitments are subjected to the discipline of accepting the ‘realities’ and ‘responsibilities’ of corporate management. In the process, it is possible to trace different sorts of experiences of becoming a ‘hybrid’. Some became ‘empowered’, enthusiastic converts to the world of management. Others remained ‘covert professionals’, using new possibilities of power and authority to preserve, deliver or even enhance services. Finally, some become disenchanted ‘cynics’ - finding ‘management speak’ a sham or smokewscreen behind which their major task was that of managing decline.

Managerialisation was also an independent process in its own right - embedded in management education and development, private and public sector management writing and the roles of agencies such as the Audit Commission, the Office for Public Management and the Local Government Management Board as well as the initiatives of specific local authorities and agencies. Waves of restructurings, cultural change programmes, newly devolved and decentralised systems and varieties of performance management washed over public service organisations. In these processes of reform, managerialism challenged the ‘old ways’ of running things in central and local government. Local political representation was marginalised by the shift of public resources to non-elected agencies and quangos, while being more tightly circumscribed by expanded central government control of both policy and resources. Methods of bureaucratic administration were challenged by the promise of a more dynamic and entrepreneurial approach to managing organizations. Professionalism was placed on the defensive by the assertion of customer-centred models of provision and the fragmentation of professional and bureaucratic tasks. This challenge was driven by the belief that professionals and street-level bureaucrats could be disciplined by devolved managerial system that installed new responsibilities for resource control.

As noted earlier, we think it is important to recognise that managerialism has contained different variants and we think that two of these have been particularly
significant. The first (sometimes termed ‘neo-Taylorism’) is a rational, means-ends pragmatism that privileges efficiency and productivity and that fosters transactional relationships of exchange and contract. This is often associated with tight systems of control, cascading targets and close monitoring of performance. The second (what became known in the 1990s as the ‘new managerialism’, Clarke and Newman, 1993; Pollitt, 1993) is more ‘people-centred’ and oriented to quality and ‘excellence’; here culture change programmes seek to ‘set the workforce free’ to innovate and improve services, and to introduce more customer centred and outward facing organisations. As a shorthand, we term these variants ‘transactional’ and ‘transformational’. Most organisations, of course, combine elements of both; indeed senior management teams are often riven with conflicts, or unstable compromises, between these different logics. But it is the ‘new managerialism’ which dominated the management text-books of the 1990s and beyond (see. Peters, 1987, 1993; Osborne and Gaebler 1992 as examples). Ideas of transformation, revolution, reinvention, and culture change pervaded the management texts, training programmes and MBA courses through which new cadres of managerial agents were constituted.

The idea of the transformational power of management, and of managers as heroic individuals who could ‘turn round’ organisations deemed to be ‘failing’, formed a very significant resource for governments seeking to reconfigure welfare states and public services. Indeed the language of management came to pervade government presentations, policy documents and even political party manifestos, as well as the reports and guidelines of the World Bank and other agencies. All reproduced the themes of ‘modernisation’ (overcoming the inflexibility of bureaucracy or the self interest of professions and administrators). All spoke of ‘culture change’ to render organisations more responsive, more customer centred, more efficient, and able to do ‘more with less’ in a ceaseless drive for greater efficiency and enhanced productivity. All spoke of the need for ‘strategies’, ‘visions’ and ‘missions’ that would enable individual organisations – and the nation itself - to compete more effectively in the global marketplace. All spoke of enhanced competition as a necessary response to overcoming the problems of the past (though of course the definitions of the problems to which competition was an answer varied widely). Managerialism, then, came to act as a sort of discursive isomorphism: a language that everyone needed to speak in order to sound ‘modern’. In the process, management came to be viewed by governments as a progressive social force:
Old assumptions were to be challenged; old alliances dissolved; old power bases weakened. This was to be accomplished not only through enforced change driven by government but by winning consent to the idea that change itself was a virtue, a necessity for Britain’s survival in the emerging global economy, and an essential precondition for its renewal as a nation (Clarke and Newman, 1997: 34).

But not everything was oriented towards transformation: organisations delivering welfare or public services also became subject to an array of targets, performance requirements, contractual relationships and inspection regimes which required a tightening of internal controls rather than greater flexibility, and which privileged transactional, rather than transformational, management. Such regimes can also be understood as a dispersal of state power (and government requirements for accountability and compliance with laws and policy guidelines) to an array of quasi-governmental bodies. The growth of what Clarke (2005) later called the ‘performance-evaluation nexus’ was significant for the functioning of this dispersed array of organisations ‘contracted’ to provide public services: governing them demanded new sorts of audit, inspection, surveillance, scrutiny and performance assessment agencies. These combined the quest for ‘economy, efficiency and effectiveness’ with the pursuit of ‘value for money’ in the development of a machinery for governing at a distance.

This unstable mix of transactional and transformational variants of managerialism continues into the present, creating the conditions for diverse responses to the circumstances of cuts and austerity. In the former, the necessity of cuts generates a tighter focus on performance and new systems of financial and organisational control, both within government itself and in the organisations delivering government funded benefits and services. But the emphasis on transformation is also being amplified as organisations are encouraged to find new innovative or entrepreneurial solutions to a declining resource base, using cuts to reshape services, reengineer organisations and develop new market strategies that might offer hope of survival and renewal.

*The dispersal of state power*
The idea of an unstable mix also characterises the ‘loose-tight’ relationships that emerged between governments and the organisations delivering or commissioning services. The basis of managerialism is that organisations – and those who manage them - must ‘set free’ from government controls to pursue flexible and adaptive strategies, enabling them to compete effectively and respond to ever changing conditions. They must be given the ‘freedom to manage’. It is this complex process of setting free that led us to characterise managerialism as the basis for the dispersal of state power. This dispersal is fundamental to the emergence of a new state form that we termed the managerial state:

Dispersal has been a political strategy for reconstructing both the state itself and the coordination of its welfare functions. … The dispersal of power forms a uniting thread that underpins a variety of new systems and mechanisms, linking the introduction of marketising processes, the expansion of other non-state sectors, processes of centralisation and decentralisation and varieties of privatisation and externalisation. Dispersal has meant the simultaneous shrinking of the state and the enlargement of its reach into civil society (through its engagement with non-state agents). (1997: 29).

As a strategy of state reconstruction, dispersal served to realign relations of power in complex ways. It disciplined the exercise of both professional and bureaucratic forms of power by introducing the organisation as the primary locus of agency and accountability: both professionals and managers became subject to the exigencies of organisational missions, business strategies and performance norms. As ties to the state were (selectively) loosened, so organisations were increasingly situated in a competitive field where survival and success depended on their capacity to secure funding and attract ‘customers’, newly enfranchised with some forms of choice between multiple providers. And dispersal also operated as an internal logic within organisations as they were divided into business units, each with their own budget and performance targets, introducing new elements of intra-organisational competition.

The dispersal of state power required new kinds of agents who could act autonomously in the interests of the organisations and services – and customers. Many managers came into management by taking on senior professional or administrative roles, others came from the proliferating MBA programmes, and yet others were imported from the private sector. All were constituted as self-governing
actors, imbued with the discourses of managerialism that privileged particular identities: as entrepreneurial, risk taking, strategising individuals. However as we noted above, the dispersal of power did not fully establish organisations and their managers as free agents; they were subject to intensified forms of centralised power and control, now operating not by direct lines of accountability or professional regulation, but through fiscal controls, performance regimes, policy guidelines and an expanding apparatus of audit and evaluation.

These dispersals – of tasks, responsibilities and power – have the effect of ‘enabling’ or ‘empowering’ different agents to provide social welfare: commercial enterprises, trusts, voluntary organisations, primary carer and so on. But at the same time they subject these agents to new constraints and demands through processes of assessment, contracting and evaluation. The capacity of agents to act or make choices is not their intrinsic property but an effect of their relationship with the state in which they are both empowered and disciplined (1997: 29)

Many of these forms of centralised control became progressively weakened in further cycles of marketisation, including the introduction of public –private partnerships, the turn to ‘outsourcing’ as a means of reducing costs, and the development of new organisational forms – in the UK trusts, academy schools, foundation hospitals - in which selected agencies were granted enhanced freedoms (including the freedom to raise loans from private capital or to establish ‘local’ wage rates). Such organisations could be exempted from some of the requirements of the regulatory apparatuses in exchange for their ‘good performance’: that is, accountability to the state and the wider public was weakened as business logics were intensified. There is no single logic or trend here: neither decentralisation nor centralisation accurately describes the shifting arrangements of power, control, and conditional autonomy that were elaborated as a new architecture of governing public services. Neither was this as a simple process of ‘marketisation’: rather governments had to make markets. In Newman and Clarke (2009), we argue that processes of market making need to be understood as political projects, with varying conditions and consequences:

These ‘marketising’ reforms have produced different sorts of market, and have reworked the relationships between states, markets and citizens around public services in diverse ways. They produce distinct social, organisational and
economic arrangements. Nevertheless, we might draw out some connecting issues about the consequences of these processes of market making.

… each of them is the result of political agency – there is no natural or inexorable spread of the market. On the contrary, they emerge from political calculations, choices and the investment of public resources. Whether market making involved the sale of council houses to tenants, or the invention and installation of a distinction between purchasers and providers within a particular service, these changes involved political, social and organizational work…. each of these specific changes was then recruited as part of the market narrative, supplying evidence of the inexorable spread of the Market and the diminution or decline of the State. Despite their differences, and despite their specific political construction, they are run together (by enthusiasts and critics alike) as evidence of the triumph of the market.

…each of them changes a particular field of practices, relationships and processes. The scale and scope of these particular sites does indeed vary – from multinational capital buying into public utilities such as water, gas or electricity provision, or global finance capital investing in building new hospitals or financing new employment services, to the division of the same departmental corridor into a dual world of purchasers and providers. But they produce different types of economic ‘opportunity’, establish new types of economic calculation, and produce new types of economic agents: people who are required to act as if they are consumers, purchasers, entrepreneurs, contractors and so on. Their specificity matters, in part because they produce particular consequences. Expanding the role (and sources of profit-taking) for corporate capital is different from creating a field of choices for consumers of a particular services (patients choosing hospitals, or parents choosing schools). Neither is the same as subjecting organisations to the rule of internal or quasi-markets as a substitute for market forces. (Newman and Clarke, 2009: 74-5)

In this section, we have tried to indicate some of the ways in which we developed an analysis of managerialism and managerialisation as key elements of projects of state reform in the UK. They contributed to the creation of a ‘dispersed state’ form in which the proliferation of agencies and organisations was coordinated by a combination of logics: marketised relationships and contractualised connections; managerial authority; and an expenaded apparatus of performance evaluation. In the following
section, we consider how these general tendencies affected one area of public provision: education.

2. THE MANAGERIAL SCHOOL

In order to assess some of the consequences of managerialism, we want to focus here on its effects on education, particularly schooling (here we need to note that our focus becomes narrower since schooling is organised and administered by different national authorities within the UK, so our account here refers mainly to schooling in England). Education is a site in which professional skills and knowledge became subordinated, in part, to new logics of organisational calculation as schools were ‘set free’ from national and local government controls and required to compete – for funding, for pupils and for reputational assets (the idea that a particular school is a ‘good school’, which itself establishes competitive advantage). Education vividly illustrates the dynamics of what we earlier termed the dispersal of state power. In Britain the ‘local management of schools’ was introduced in the 1988 Education Reform Act, with budgets becoming mostly devolved to selected schools rather than being held by local education authorities pursuing policies for a whole municipal area. This was accompanied by two other devices that ‘empowered’ local school managers (head teachers). One was the introduction of a greater diversity of school types, allowing local specialisation and generating enhanced freedoms for some schools. The second was the doctrine of parental choice, which placed individual schools in direct competition with each other in attracting the parents of potential pupils. Coupled with devolved budgets and local management this opened up new dynamics and strategies, of which we want to highlight two. ‘Cream skimming’ is an organisational logic that seeks to secure the most able pupils in order to enable it to perform well in the league tables of examination success and thus attract parental customers of good quality. ‘Boundary management’ is a technique whereby the school defends itself from ‘difficult’ – and thus potentially expensive – pupils. This might include pupils with special needs; disruptive pupils, the children of migrants and asylum seekers, and so on.

Such strategies were a product of the imperative to privilege the performance and success of an individual school over wider professional loyalties or public service commitments. Of course such strategies did not necessarily displace other loyalties and commitments; they did not determine what happened in schools, nor prevent informal collaborations between them. Bureaucratic, professional and managerial
power were overlaid on each other in complex ways, creating a field of tensions – tensions which might be played out in the organisational culture, in staff meetings, in performance assessment regimes, in enrolment and admission policies, in interactions between the school and its parents and pupils, and in inter-school relationships, and of course in the work of individual teachers. And the state did not abandon its governing role completely in this dispersal of power. It set out rules of the game (through quota systems, by grouping schools into consortia, and so on), rules which schools might then seek to subvert. It is to be emphasised that they did so not with any malign purpose – their aim was simply to ensure the effectiveness and survival of ‘their’ school by maximising business success and thereby benefiting its present and future pupils. But the dominant focus on the individual school as a quasi-business positioned in a competitive field had profound consequences for the sustainability of notions of education as a wider public good.

Such notions were partly inscribed in the new agencies to which the governance of education was devolved. These included local boards of governors for individual schools, but also new national agencies concerned with specifying the content of the curriculum, setting standards and carrying out school inspections. These reduced the discretion of teachers as professionals, and weakened the capacity of local municipalities to coordinate and direct local education systems. Together these reforms, argues Gewirtz, were designed to:

unleash the productive potential of school managers whilst constraining what were seen as the stultifying bureaucratic procedures of LEAs [local education authorities]. The idea was that by giving headteachers and governors control over their budgets and by making school income dependent on attracting custom, senior managers in schools would have both the tools and the incentive to behave in more cost effective, flexible, competitive, consumer satisfying and innovative ways. (2002: 60)

It is of course very difficult to argue against such benefits. But Gewirtz goes on to show how such policies led to the greater exploitation of teaching staff while offering them less job satisfaction. They also, she argues, resulted in the penetration of capitalist values and a capitalist rationality into the education system and a consequent turn away from the idea of schooling as a means of redressing structural patterns of social injustice. They produced a climate in which children were viewed as commodities that were differentially valued. The reforms also tended to produce a
privileging of traditionalist pedagogies that were in line with a utilitarian, exam oriented performance regime, and an exacerbation of inequalities in access to – and progress through – schooling.

As we argued in the previous section, the ‘liberation’ of individual organisations to manage themselves is disciplined in part by national regimes of target-setting and by scrutiny of inspection or audit agencies. In England, state schooling has been subject to inspection since the 19th century. However, the continued presence of Her Majesty’s Inspectors for education in schools from 1839 to 2010 conceals some radical discontinuities in its organisation and practice. One critical break occurred in 1986 when the inspection function was relocated in the newly created Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted), following political attacks centred on the Inspectors’ perceived collusion with (if not actual advocacy of) liberal/progressive/permissive or child-centred pedagogy. What had been a largely professional exercise conducted within the world of schooling and involved advising governments on the basis of professional judgement became an explicitly evaluative practice. It was exercised over schools, producing public judgements and classifications for a set of assumed non-governmental as well as governmental audiences (teachers, parents, pupils, local authorities, employers, sponsors, local communities: the field of potential ‘stakeholders’. Inspection also became a sub-contracted process, with a smaller number of centrally appointed HMIIs being supplemented by inspectors recruited through three agencies for the conduct of inspections. Raising education standards also means improving ‘value for money’ and the ‘efficiency and effectiveness’ of providers (as well as the aim to ‘reduce bureaucracy’ (Ofsted 2009). Ofsted is known for taking an assertive, if not abrasive, view of schools and teachers (see Ozga et al, forthcoming on the difference between English and Scottish inspection regimes).

Studies have traced parallel tendencies in other fields of public services, e.g., in relation to health (Pollock, 2004) and Higher Education (Clarke, 2010a; Collini, 2012) and other aspects of the state subjected to the managerial prerogative. Such critiques have also highlighted the implications of ‘public-private partnerships’ that opened up public institutions to globalising capitalist logics, preparing the way for the rose of global companies selling health, education and other services. In ‘Education plc’ (2007), Ball traces the rise of education as ‘big business’ but also warns of the dangers of totalising arguments; privatisation, he argues, involves a ‘a variety of kinds of change in political processes and the role of the state, in organisations,
people and their social relationships. It may be that we should see privatisation as part of a much larger canvas of social changes and changes in the social’ (2007: 185). He also draws attention to the scope and complexity of the issues at stake, rendering straightforward conclusions problematic:

Over the course of the research I.... found it increasingly difficult to find a solid and comfortable personal position from which to view privatisation., partly because it is not a single phenomenon with uniform characteristics. It also became more and more clear to me that a blanket defence of the public sector, as it is or was, over the destructive inroads of privatisation is untenable. There is no going back to a past I which the public sector as a whole worked well and worked fairly in the interests of all learners. There was no such past. (Ball, 2007: 187; see also Clarke’s critique of nostalgia in higher education: 2010a).

This does not return us to a position in which it does not matter ‘who delivers public services’, but is a timely reminder about the contradictoriness of past formations, the ambiguities of change and the uncertainty of its outcomes. In addition, the idea that ‘older’ values and virtues – of state welfare, of bureaucratic accountability, of social justice, of professional discretion – have simply been supplanted by managerialism is somewhat misleading. What we have been describing here is a dominant ideology and set of policies configured within a field of tensions. Education, within and beyond the UK, has been the subject of a multiplicity of political projects, producing ambiguity in the goals to be pursued; and managerial efficiency has not been the only global template. For example, PISA (the Programme for International Student Assessment) is an OECD agency that assesses and compares educational outcomes across participating nations and has driven policy exchanges, comparative anxiety and competitive positioning. Even within an individual nation state, education has been the focus of conflicting reform projects. In *Modernising Governance*, written in 2001 to capture the working out of some of these processes under the Blair government, Newman pointed to the difficult and unstable coexistence of bureaucratic and managerial power, and how these formations intersected – uncomfortably and unevenly - with emerging discourses of network governance and self-governance (Newman, 2001). This challenges the idea of managerialism as a single coordinating logic. We will have more to say about such shifts and tensions in the next section. What matters, however, is that the dispersal of state power to managerial agents has meant that – whatever the values and commitments of those agents – the tensions
between different ideologies, regimes and logics have to be negotiated at the level of
the individual organisation.

3. THE DEATH OF THE PUBLIC?

One of our concerns about the rise of managerialism was its consequences for public
rationalities and norms. In Publics, Politics and Power – written just over a decade
after the Managerial State was published – we offered an analysis of a rather
different political conjuncture, characterised by the decline or retreat of publicness in
the face of the rise of markets, consumerism and individualism. But we also noted
the increased attention being paid to issues of public participation, public governance
and public value. This paradox is one route into understanding the contradictory
logics of the Third Way governments that came to prominence in the UK and some
other European countries from the late 1990s. These were governments which
sought to curtail state expenditure (by extending the efficiency logics of
managerialism) while adopting more ‘social strategies of governing in order to
address some of the social issues and problems – increasing inequality and social
disaffection, disadvantaged neighbourhoods, homelessness, poor health and low
education performance among some population groups - that had, in part, been
exacerbated by the fragmenting and individualising logics of the previous two
decades.

When we revisited our analysis of the managerial state – just before the banking
crisis - the consequences of the decline of notions of publics and publicness were
stark. The public sector had been subjected to renewed processes of fragmentation
and marketisation (what we had described as ‘dispersal’) and it was less clear where
and how difficult decisions about the allocation of scarce resources were being
made; indeed, it appeared that resource distribution was increasingly being left to
market mechanisms. The (once integrated) public sector had been seamlessly
transformed into a series of particular services provided by a diversity of
organisations, with the question of who should deliver them turned into a technical,
rather than value based or political, question. The dominant view was that it was of
little or no consequence whether they should be delivered by a private sector
company, a voluntary or third sector body or a public sector organisation. And
increasingly the distinctiveness of each sector became blurred as new organisational
forms proliferated- in which public and private modes of authority and styles of
working were unevenly and unpredictably combined. The outcomes were ambiguous:
as Ball (2010) notes, in the case of education as teachers and other public staff were transferred to, or chose to work within, schools run by private sector companies, they tended to take their professional and public values with them being one of the currents that produce hybridised subjects, spaces and discourse communities. Voluntary or third sector organisations that were contracted to deliver public services attempted to retain a distinctive ethos; indeed it was this distinctiveness that often enabled them to bid successfully for contracts to serve ‘difficult’ population groups or to deliver services in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. But in both cases, managerial norms and logics were in tension with, rather than being displaced by, alternative ideas and practices. Voluntary and community based organisations and civil society groups contracted to deliver services or participate in partnerships had to demonstrate their ‘business skills’, being able to demonstrate, for example, an architecture of financial and performance oriented management systems and control mechanisms.

At the same time notions of the public itself were dissolved as the users of public services became redesignated as customers or consumers. The constitution of the citizen-consumer was a logical consequence of the rise of managerialism; the business model which organisations were encouraged to adopt placed a rhetorical premium on customer centredness and customer satisfaction. As we argued elsewhere (Clarke et al 2007), consumerism is also an ambiguous organisational logic for public services. It is clearly preferable for service users to have access to flexible and responsive services, tailored where possible to their individual needs and circumstances. However, the consumerist ethos privileges the individual user in ways that often take little account of any conception of a wider public good or interest. Again in relation to education, the middle class parents who are better able to articulate their needs, to deploy a range of economic, social and cultural capital, to claim their (consumer) rights and to make informed choices can gain preferential access to schools with a ‘good reputation’, i.e., a track record in securing good examination performance. The introduction of a certain element of consumer choice exacerbates the practices of cream skimming and boundary management described earlier, but here those processes are driven ‘from below’. The result is a displacement of public rationalities: decisions about how collective goods are to be allocated, how and where public judgements are to be made, and how accountability to a wider public for what happens in schools to be exercised.
In trying to think about this loss of the public rationalities and of public goods, however, we confronted a number of puzzles. First, the solidarities on which notions of a public had previously relied were, in the post-war formation of welfare states, national solidarities. How, then, was it possible to rethink notions of the public beyond the nation? Many issues, from environmental governance to the management of public health, or from minority inclusion to migrant and mobile populations, can no longer effectively be pursued and managed at a national level or within ethno-nationalist conceptions of a public. Second, given the transformations of the state referred to earlier, and the dispersal of state power to a plurality of organisations, institutions and businesses, how might it be possible to nevertheless inscribe public services with wider public values? A number of developments took place in Britain and other European nations that attempted to introduce more integrative conceptions of public governance that responded to the increasing social and political demands posed by complex problems that a fragmented array of individual organisations could not solve (see for example, Kremer and Tonkens, 2006). And third, consumerism was not the only reconfiguration of the public that was taking place: in their attempts to transform welfare states, governments also sought to discover and enrol responsible, self governing communities and looked to civil society – and the ‘ordinary people’ who inhabited it – as offering resources and assets beyond the state.

The results of these developments were paradoxical. Attempts to overcome individualisation and fragmentation led to a significant focus on the benefits of so called ‘network’ governance. This was both a descriptive and normative concept which privileged collaboration within and across sectoral boundaries, and which focused on the necessity of developing integrated solutions to complex social problems which traversed the boundaries of individual ministries, agencies or organisations. It showed how public value might be reinscribed by organisational collaboration, by what came to be termed ‘joined up government’, by the turn to partnership working, and by governments attempting to secure policy outcomes through more sophisticated contracting and commissioning arrangements. There was even speculation that emerging patterns of organising public services might mean that the New Public Management was being ‘transcended’ (Christensen and Laegried, 2007). An extensive literature emerged which combined (sometimes implicit) critiques of managerialism with prescriptions for alternative ways of commissioning and delivering services (e.g., Bartlett et al., 2008; Brooks, 2007, Leadbetter and Cottam, 2007; but see also Cutler et al., 2007). The definition of networks was quite expansive, bringing into view the particular contribution of civil
society groups (whose informal knowledge of local conditions and access to resources could be tapped) and of the public itself (as the ‘co-producers’ of services (e.g., Needham, 2007; Newman et al, 2008). Other commentators pointed to ways in which the enhancement of public participation and civic engagement could help transform public services ‘from below’ while also promoting democratic renewal (Wainwright, 2009). These developments can be viewed as the dominant template for waves of public service and welfare state reform in Western Europe and many other nations from the late 1990s onwards. However it is important to stress that this template did not replace managerialism: rather these different, and contradictory, logics coexisted with managerialism, producing a field of tensions.

Managerialism was however not just in tension with these emergent public, democratic and collaborative logics, it also provided the rationale for the resolution of the tensions they jointly generated in at least two ways. First, the dispersal of power that was a fundamental characteristic of the managerial state served to distance ministers and other politicians from the difficult sites in which contradictory goals had to be reconciled. While politicians might still be held accountable for policy outcomes, the arenas in which difficult decisions about how policy goals were to be delivered were placed now ‘at arm’s length’ from central government itself. A number of critical cases (incidents of maladministration, failure to deal effectively with public health or environmental crises, the failure of police forces to adequately deal with instances of public disorder, failures of border management and security and so on) suggest that this strategy of dispersal did not effectively distance government from public and media perceptions of where accountability should lie. Nevertheless, the norm of managerial, rather than political accountability, served to represent difficult decisions as a matter of strategic choices, supported by an array of technical systems (action planning, project management, budgetary adjustments, efficiency calculations, performance management systems, contract specifications and so on). As such difficult decisions tended to be removed from the political domain, despite the array of public participation exercises that provided a surface appearance of democratic involvement and the enhancement of public accountability.

The second way in which managerialism provided the rationale for resolving tensions between competing logics was through the emergence of what might be termed ‘managerial governance’. The New Labour governments in the UK offer a particularly striking example. They developed a technocratic approach to policy development and implementation – centred on the mantra of ‘what counts is what works’ (a view that –
rhetorically, at least – insisted on ‘evidence-based’ policy and practice). This was supplemented by a commitment to performance managing public service provision through an apparatus of targets and agencies for scrutiny and evaluation to assess performance levels. This mode of governing built on the dispersed state constructed under the previous Conservative governments, continuing with a model of principal-agent relationships between the centre and providers, extending the ‘market’ for service provision to encourage a ‘greater diversity’ of provider organisations, and emphasising the involvement of the private sector in both funding (through the Private Finance Initiative) and provision (in various Public Private Partnerships).

This technocratic, managerial style of governing did not of course mean the end of ideology; the Blair government was forceful in its promulgation of ideologies of the new (in its very name – ‘New Labour’ and in its attempt to drive through state modernisation programmes: see Clarke and Newman, 2004). But the technocratic style presented an image of a post-ideological mode of politics. That is, it assumed a new social and political settlement based on the idea that deep conflicts and social divisions had now been resolved, and that any residual difficulties were amenable to specific governmental interventions. In our study of citizen-consumers, we argued that it was important to consider New Labour as a complex political project that drew on and adaoated a variety of different ideological, discursive and cultural resources in its representations of the challenges of being and becoming modern. We suggested that characterising New Labour simply as ‘neo-liberal’ or even as a hybrid of neo-liberalism plus vestiges of social democracy, missed the complex work of articulation that went into making and sustaining (or reinventing) the New Labour political project:

We think attention to New Labour’s heterogeneity is important. The multiple strategies, modes of governance, combined and contradictory practices suggest that it may be less than coherent or unified. In part, this reflects the ‘innovative’ character of governing – the search to find ways of making the world conform to imagined conceptions of how it should work. But this heterogeneity also arises at the intersection of the governmental and the political (in its narrower sense). New Labour may be engaged in a wider process of shifting or emergent governmentalities, but it is also a political agent: attempting to rule, and trying to stay popular in general and specific terms (involving both wider public opinion and those groups or interests that it sees as ‘key stakeholders’ and ‘opinion formers’). If we examine the intersections of the governmental and the political, some peculiar paradoxes
come to light. One is the ‘hyperactivity’ of political/policy innovation in an era where demands that ‘something must be done’ continue to be addressed to the government, even as neo-liberal governmentality centres on ‘governing at a distance’ through ‘self-governing subjects’. A second is the associated temptation for ‘hands on’ policy direction (at least in some areas) rather than a ‘hands off’ approach to devolved practices. A third is the oscillation between a commitment to ‘self-governance’ (autonomous, choice-making individuals) and a recurrent moral authoritarianism (intervening on the growing numbers of people seen to be ‘behaving badly’). Our study has traced only part of this heterogeneity of modes and practices of governing…They pose the problem of how we can think of this as field of strategies, technologies and practices of governing that has no essential coherence, but is organised or articulated as a ‘unity in difference’. (Clarke et al., 2007: 149)

But what provides a consistent and unifying thread to this unity in difference – as we argued in Publics, Politics and Power – is the continuing presence and force of managerialism as a principle for ordering the relations and forms of power in a dispersed state. Managerialism, in that sense, is both the practical theory that enables a dispersed state to be constructed and the promise that it will ‘deliver’ if only managers are allowed to ‘do the right thing’. Much discussion – in the UK and elsewhere – about New Labour and the Third Way has concentrated heavily on the issues of politics and ideology as they inform economic, social and public policy and the relationships between them. While we do not want to detract from their importance, we also think it is important not to neglect the continuing centrality of managerialism as the guiding principle and promise of state reform.

4. SPEAKING TO THE PRESENT?

The banking crisis of 2008 created a brief rupture in the ‘taken for granted’ logics of rule that we have traced in the previous sections. For a while at least it appeared that faith in the magic of markets had declined; their failure to offer continuous growth and to secure economic and political stability was made starkly evident. States stepped in as the rescuers of failed financial institutions and attempted to pacify panicked and panicking markets. There was talk of greater regulation of financial services, but also concern about the threat this would pose to particular national interests, including those of Britain. Public institutions appeared as the potential saviours of global capitalism; but their interventions were judged not by reference to the public good,
but by the evaluations of that disembodied but highly nervous entity, ‘the market’ (Clarke, 2009). The banking crisis also challenged faith in the authority of expertise: particularly the authority of economists and of managers and entrepreneurial leaders – here in the form of the managers of investment funds and financial institutions – who had been ‘set free’ to inflict damage (to people, to investors, to nations and ultimately to the stability of the global economy). However ‘business as usual’ was quickly restored, with promised regulation and reform failing to materialise and with some of the worst excesses of ‘empowered’ managerial and entrepreneurial actors continuing, despite considerable public distrust and anger.

The promised realignment of state and markets has not yet occurred. Indeed state institutions and public logics were further weakened as the economic damage wrought by the banking crisis was transformed into fiscal crises of nation states, economic recession and – in many places including the UK – the governmental imposition of austerity measures. We think it is important to draw attention to the amount of ideological and discursive work that has gone into resignifying these crises: the symbolic move from a crisis of finance capital (or neo-liberalism) to a crisis of public debt is a significant one and appears to have transformed national publics into the abject bearers of individual and collective indebtedness. But it is also important to trace the ways in which these multiple crises once again destabilised the attempts to construct political, economic and social settlements (and the organisational forms of the state required to support them). The various attempts to ‘live with’ neo-liberalism as a global economic strategy have continued to fail as national and regional political regimes in Europe, at least, fail to domesticate the contradictions and suffer political turbulence – manifested in varieties of political disaffection, dissent, cynicism, withdrawal and the rise of ethno-nationalist politics in many European countries. Equally, it has proved hard to stabilise a lasting social settlement in the face of economic instability, the transformations and degradations of contemporary wage labour, increasingly mobile populations and varieties of social diversity. Responses to these oscillate between the promised individualising liberations of consumerism (everyone is entitled to make their choices) and the nostalgic fantasies of older ways of life (the solidity of the patriarchal family; the comfort of a ethnically pure nation; and the predictability of a social order in which people knew their place and shared values disciplined all forms of conduct).

‘Austerity’ is but the latest political and governmental project to attempt to articulate new settlements. It seeks to imagine a shared (national) suffering: in the words of the
UK coalition government, ‘we are all in this together’, but it struggles to ground this in any strongly shared social experience in the face of deepening material inequalities (exacerbated by the sorts of public spending cuts being made by austere governments). Equally, austerity seeks to harness people to a shared national mission: in the UK, distinctions are consistently made between the virtuous necessity of the choices being made by the government, compared to the enforced misery of (irresponsible) Eurozone countries (Clarke, 2012). But austerity is dominated by the voracious demands of an unreformed global economy: financial markets, credit rating agencies, banks and other financial institutions – and, in the UK, the hegemonic position of the City of London – represent a continuing problem for constructing new political and social settlements. Instead, austerity politics promises a further retrenchment of public services, increasing social and political disorder, new landscapes of social inequality and increasingly disaffected political subjects (Clarke and Newman, forthcoming).

It is also important that the politics of austerity and the resulting policies have been delivered through many of the features of the managerial state we outlined in the first section. Although the 2010 UK coalition government announced the total cuts in expenditure it planned to implement year on year, and could deliver cuts to welfare benefits directly, the dispersal of power we referred to earlier meant that detailed decisions of what and how to cut public services were made by particular hospitals, local authorities, care providers, voluntary bodies and so on. Although the plans were set centrally, the pain was devolved, and the responsibility and accountability of those inflicting it were rendered obscure. In the terms of our argument, the dispersal of state power to managerial agents served to protect government itself, albeit unevenly.

At the same time, however, managers themselves were exposed to new threats. While managers were the agents charged with deciding where and how cuts were to be implemented in specific services, at the same time they came to be discursively positioned as ‘overheads’ (in contrast to the valued ‘front line’ of nurses, teachers and so on) and thus became vulnerable to job losses. It seemed that the expansion of the managerial cadre had been curtailed. However while managers working in state institutions and public services faced a more precarious futures, so the use of management consultants expanded. In Britain at least the reengineering and outsourcing of services, the turn to commissioning rather than providing, the introduction of new ‘hybridised’ organisational forms (health trusts, academy schools,
social enterprise providers of care and welfare services, General Practitioners involvement in commissioning health services, all operating independently in an increasingly ‘free’ marketplace) brought extensive benefits to corporate providers of consultancy and financial services. For example, The Guardian newspaper reported (13.02.2012) that the NHS was preparing to spend £7 million on advisers to teach GPs the ‘business skills’ they need to manage the newly devolved commissioning budgets. At the forefront of this new business were international consultancy companies such as McKinsey and KPMG (who had also provided advisors to the government on how to devolve commissioning budgets).

The concept of the managerial state, then, can continue to help point to some of the contradictory dynamics set loose by the financial crisis and its ‘austere’ aftermath. However we want to end where we began – asking how the conditions of crisis can produce wider dynamics in which previous social, economic and political settlements become unravelled and something new – a different order of rule, a new struggle for consent, a set of new political projects, or the emergence of new patterns of political struggle and dissent – might emerge. In short, we want to end by asking how can the kind of conjunctural analysis we attempted in *The Managerial State* might speak to the present?

In trying to answer this question briefly, we think there are three sets of tendencies that are particularly significant. These shape the contradictions of the present moment and represent possible lines of force on which futures might be developed. First, we think it is absolutely central to take stock of the capacity of the neo-liberal project to renew itself through crisis and failure, always imagining a future that can be achieved if only neo-liberalism is done ‘properly’. This argument has been advanced by Jamie Peck who describes neo-liberalism as always ‘flailing and failing forwards’:

> Neoliberalism’s curse, then, is that it cannot help itself but to be a kind of interventionist project, which confers on the project a certain directionality, if not a destination…. To the extent that neoliberalism has been, since the 1970s, “victorious” in the war of ideas, its victories have always been Pyrrhic and partial ones. Yet the project ploughs forward, never arriving at its stated destination, and never knowing where to stop. (Peck 2010:7)

In this respect, the constant reinvention of neo-liberalism means that it both strives to create new settlements and always undermines or destabilises them, not least because of its capacity to constantly generate new contradictions and antagonisms.
across social formations. Despite being doomed to recurrent failure, it has crowded out other framings – at least in the dominant political ideologies, both nationally and internationally. This makes for uncomfortable and contradictory assemblages in which the continuity of the neo-liberal fantasy is always combined with efforts to find social and political fixes that stabilise, domesticate and garner popular support for it.

Second, we think that neo-liberalism – in its many variants – lives uncomfortably with democratic political processes. It has a history of finding forms of authoritarianism more congenial company (from the test bed of Chile under Pinochet onwards). And in the current conjuncture, the misfortunes of the southern Eurozone states are reminiscent of earlier IMF induced austerity programmes directed at African and Latin American states in which popular consent is the least important issue. The displacement of governments – through one means or another – in Spain, Greece and Italy in the drive for (neo-liberal) austerity raises questions about the need and desire for national political direction and consent. Certainly, the enthusiasm for a ‘technocratic’ mode of governing has nationally specific conditions in the Italian context (Berlusconi’s hyper-populism among them), but the affinities between depoliticising forms of rule (technocracy and managerialism) and neo-liberalism are important. At the minimum, the globalising drive of the neo-liberal imaginary has always allowed national governments the pretext to claim they ‘have no choice’ (but to de-regulate, reduce taxes, cut public services, marketwise, privatisate, etc). But this remains an unstable and contradictory field, given that people demand and expect political leadership – and sustain a view that such leaders should be responsible and accountable (a view that co-exists with cynicism and disaffection).

Thirdly, we think this field of the popular is traversed by very different and contradictory tendencies. There is the increasing tendency towards populist politics in democratic polities; there is the excitement of new media enabling popular mobilizations and ways of coming to voice; there is the veneration of popular voice in old media (public participation in reality TV, etc); and there is the widespread governmental enthusiasm for enrolling ‘ordinary people’ in the business of governing (Clarke, 2010b). From the Conservative fantasy of the ‘Big Society’ and do-it-yourself welfare to public participation in budgeting and service planning; from self-management initiatives in services to citizens’ juries – ‘ordinary people’ being active, being involved, being engaged and being responsible is the core objective of a whole range of political and governmental initiatives. As we have argued (New,man and Clarke, 2009; Clarke, 2010), the key characteristic of such ordinary people is that
they are viewed as non-political – they stand both above and below politics. It is this non-political character that guarantees their virtuousness. It is also the fantasy that is doomed to disappointment: from every de-politicising move, there is always the risk that politics is rediscovered and reasserted. Even in the depths of the dispersed and managerialised state, politics persists.

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Concern about infrastructure needs and the impact of deferred maintenance has been recognized within the nuclear security enterprise for years. Under the direction of the Associate Administrator of the Office of Safety, Infrastructure, and Operations (NA-50), an Infrastructure Roadmap was issued in March 2017 to improve NNSA infrastructure management. The panel was told that, using new data-driven, risk-informed infrastructure tools, NA-50 has made improvements and progress in tackling significant infrastructure needs, a fact that was also