A Typology of Civil Wars

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My research on civil war is structured by a simple distinction between the technology of violence (the weapon), the territoriality of violence (the front), and finally the meaning of violence (the discourse). In the present paper the technology of violence has been the main structuring principle. The front and the discourse of civil war will be the subjects for the main body of my thesis to be submitted next year, based on my South African field studies.

The present paper is an edited version without the discussions of the Los Angeles riot 1992, the Palestine intifada 1987, the Brazilian terrorism 1970, the Chinese guerrilla war 1934-35, the Bolivian coup 1971, the Afghan frontal civil war 1978-1996, the humanitarian intervention in Somalia 1992, and the Bosnian inverse civil war 1994-95, found in the unedited version. The unedited version can be obtained from the author.

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I. INTRODUCTION

(i) recognising civil war

Suddenly after 1989 states appeared to collapse. With the Soviet Union violently breaking apart, endless terror in Yugoslavia, and then an African holocaust in Rwanda civil war as an agent of state destruction was put on the global agenda. An observer of the civil war in Afghanistan wrote: “The developed country does not, as Marx thought, show the backward country its future; the fragmenting countries show the integrating ones the dark side of their common present.” (Rubin 1995:5)

There are still more than 20,000 nuclear warheads in the world’s arsenals (SIPRI 1995), and no assessment of global security can afford to forget them, but below the level of nuclear war, civil war rather than interstate war is becoming the most realistic military threat to national security. Adam Daniel Rotfeld, director of SIPRI, writes in his introduction to the 1995 yearbook, that “the main sources of threat in the world today are not conflicts between states, but within them... among the 31 major armed conflicts in 1994 no ‘classic’ war was being waged.” (Rotfeld 1995:4-5, emp. in original). Of the 82 armed conflicts occurring 1989-1992 only three were interstate, while the rest was intra-state. More than half of the armed conflicts in 1993 had been going on for ten years or more, with a toll of four to six million human lives. (See UNDP, 1994, Chap. 3). This now often repeated fact has profound implications for our understanding of contemporary armed conflict, and of policies attempting to reduce them.

This confronts the international community with the challenge of how to prevent or at least to contain civil wars and a rapidly growing number of national armies with the acute problem of how to fight a civil war, either in your own country or as participant in a UN-operation targeted for somebody else’s civil war. If your resources are limited you have to prioritise for the internal war. In Russia the Red Army, Navy and Airforce intended for conventional interstate war are tottering along without pay, housing, or new weapons while the so-called ‘other forces’ deployed in intra-state war, i.e. the Ministry of the Interior special forces, border troops and security forces still get paid, trained, equipped, etc. (Weekendavisen, 15-21 Nov. 1996). In only seven years from January 1988 to December 1994 the intervention of the world community in civil wars grew from 5 peacekeeping operations involving 9570 military personnel with a budget of $ 230,4 million to 17 operations involving
73.393 military personnel with a budget of $3610 million. And behind the pure numerical escalation is the fateful move towards peace enforcing operations.

This brave new world of civil wars, “is still a world not fully understood” as Boutros-Ghali said. (Rotfeld 1995:10). Indeed not. In fact I have not come across one single book-length academic treatment of what a civil war is.

While the range of literature reflecting upon the anatomy of civil war is very short indeed, the number of books telling the story of one particular civil war runs into several hundreds. More than two thirds of all these studies deal with the American Civil War (1861-65) a lot of which is pure “bugles and buttons history”. The English Civil War (1640-60) makes a very small number two, and way down on the civil war hit-list come the two most studied twentieth century civil wars, the Russian (1918-21) and the Spanish (1936-39). The rare animal of civil war has hardly left any traces in the forest of lexicons. The lexicons repeat the discrepancy found in books on civil war; the empirical stuff of individual civil wars is scattered chaotically under diverse headings and simultaneously the total non-existence of a concept. In the works listed above the only approximation of a conceptual analysis

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2 See Peter Paret’s revealing essay on American military history; Paret 1992.
is found in *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* in the article “Aufnahmezustand” and under “Krieg” in the sub-section “Revolutionäre Bürgerkrieg”.

Since Thomas Hobbes published his *Behemoth: The History of the Causes of The Civil Wars in England, and of The Counsels and Artifacts By Which They Were Carried On From The Year 1640 To The Year 1660*, in 1668 (17 years after the first edition of Leviathan) not much ink has been wasted on civil wars. Now in these post-1989 days a trickle has started to appear. In 1993 Hans Magnus Enzensberger published his important and vitriolic essay *Aussichten auf den Bürgerkrieg*, (English translation 1994). Journalism like Robert D. Kaplan’s article *The Coming Anarchy*, (Kaplan, 1994) reportedly read with great concern by Bill Clinton and now extended to a book, and Linda Schuster’s grisly *The Final Days of Dr Doe* on gang-war in Liberia (Schuster, 1994), are examples of how to alarm the western public about the reality of the ‘New World Order’. Unpublished papers began circulating on universities tentatively linking civil war and social theory (like the early attempt by Mike Drake, 1996). In 1996 John Keane published his *Reflections on Violence*, a reply to Enzensberger on behalf of civil society. These texts are contemporary with the convulsions of the rise and fall of the nation state world. Thomas Hobbes witnessed how The English Civil War created the first true nation state while Enzensberger asks if the current civil wars herald a new period in world history.

The three hundred years of near-silence from Hobbes to Enzensberger is a very strange fact; John Keane finds the virtual absence of reflection upon civil war ‘scandalous’, and it is certainly surprising considering the sheer bloody bulk of ‘real existing’ civil wars; one researcher counts 106 civil wars from 1816 to 1980 claiming more than 9 million lives (Singer 1982). It is tempting to interpret this anomaly as a reflection of the way war developed in our ‘long century of violence’ (Keane). The victory of the nation state in the twentieth century resulted in the

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hegemony of ‘realist’ thinking on matters martial\textsuperscript{6}. Even Lenin jettisoned - as ruler of a nation state - his long-held view that the revolutionary civil war, that is the class-war between the workers of the world against the capitalists, was superior to the imperialist wars amongst states, and he foresaw instead war between two camps of nation states, “We are living not merely in a state, but in a system of states, and it is inconceivable for the Soviet Republic to exist alongside of the imperialist states for any length of time. One or the other must triumph in the end... If the ruling class, the proletariat, wants to hold power, it must therefore, prove its ability to do so by its military organisation [as a nation-state, H.T.].”\textsuperscript{7} World Wars of a terrifying scale made the experience of, say, the Spanish civil war seem irrelevant to the problem of war and peace. The oceanic movements of total war among nation states washed out the cross-currents of civil wars. “Fat Boy” introduced a frightening new meaning of war in Hiroshima. World War Two-like warfare became “conventional war”, and civil wars disappeared below the icy crust of an ‘exterminist society’ busy preparing atomic war; the key phrase in E.P. Thompson's eloquent, desperate, and influential book from 1982. Even where civil wars were noticed as such, as in Russia or Algeria, their internal dynamics were re-read as ‘revolution’ or ‘national liberation’. For military and political writers civil war seemed to be utterly dated. Yet civil wars continued to happen\textsuperscript{8}, and below the fragile nuclear deterrent established in the 1950s Washington and Moscow jockeyed to subordinate the dynamics of ever more internal military conflicts their own bi-polar struggle. Civil wars were denied intrinsic meaning and became proxies for “Third World competition between the U.S. and Marxist-Leninist states.” (Odom 1992:224). William E. Odom, until 1988 director of the National Security Agency in Washington, was in complete agreement with the “Marxist-Leninist camp” on this score. Soviet military doctrine during the Breshnev era also used the two-camp formula with ‘national liberation struggle’ a proxy for the global war between

\textsuperscript{6} Realism takes legitimately the state as the basic unit in any analysis of international relations and national security, but tends to disregard other actors in particular internal sub-state actors. Writers such as Hans J. Morgenthau, Edward Hallet Carr, Henry Kissinger and Hedley Bull are prominent; for an introduction see Viotti, 1990.


\textsuperscript{8} Small and Singer list 49 civil wars 1946-1980 world-wide (Singer, 1982:222).
‘imperialism’ and ‘revolution’. “Imperialist intervention against revolutionary forces in a civil war would convert the war into a national liberation struggle against the imperialists.” (Marxism and Communism 1972:315).

Right up until the Soviet Union lost the Cold War academic treatments of civil wars, in the 'free' as well as the 'revolutionary' camp, was limited to utilitarian manuals on how to win an “internal war”, “local war”, “low intensity conflict”, “unconventional war”, “wars of the third kind”, “insurgency”, “revolutionary warfare”, “guerrilla war”, “wars of national liberation”, or even a “dirty war”. Yet all the tags put on incidents of non-international war in the literature did not add up to a concept of civil war or any real understanding of how military and political, state and individual forces co-determined the outcome of civil wars. Civil war remained in a grey zone between the interstate war, the preserve of realist international relations theory, and violence, the preserve of the mainstream social sciences. Only now do we see the beginning of a post-Cold War debate on intrastate war, broad ranged security, multilayered international relations, conditional national sovereignty and multi-national peace enforcing operations.

(ii) counting civil war

The standard realist or neo-realist approach to international relations has the great advantage to policy-makers that global processes may be conceptualised at a state-to-state level immediately relevant to their decision-making. It is thus no surprise, but not given, that surveys like the SIPRI yearbooks use a realist methodology. Yet civil war is very difficult to conceptualise in the realist tradition because wars waged inside states used to be invisible to the international relations gaze.

SIPRI struggles to quantify this new and enigmatic war-within-states based on a standard realist state-centred definition of war (government action - effective army resistance - non-civilian casualties etc.) that is rather insensitive to exactly the crucial civilian aspect of civil wars. In this they seem to follow the influential

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9 Ted Robert Gurr has been very influential since the 1970s in the mainstream; a massive summary (not synthesis) of Non-Marxist social and political science findings on political violence and revolutions is Zimmermann (1983) with 150 pages of bibliography.

10 See Buzan 1990 for an introduction; Neumann 1995 and Wæver 1996 for front-line explorations of this still new terrain, and Eide 1995 for reports on practical application.
statistical work by David Singer and Melvin Small whose 1982 publication “Resort To Arms, International and Civil Wars, 1816 - 1980” still stands as one of the most comprehensive compilations of statistics on the incidence of civil (and international) war. However Singer and Small do not attempt a theoretical explanation of the phenomena of civil war, but simply define civil war in nation-states with a view of maximum statistical precision as: “military action, (a) internal to the metropole (mother country), (b) with the active participation of the national government, and (c) with effective resistance by both sides” (Singer and Small 1980: 210). The first criterion of internality rules out many conflicts normally seen as civil wars, such as colonial wars and wars of national liberation. The second criterion excludes regional (sub-state) conflicts and communal violence because the state is not involved. Thirdly they do not consider a massacre or genocide a civil war because it lacks ‘effective resistance’. Finally, to make it onto their list a civil war must have had a total of more than 1000 battle deaths (the arbitrary but standard threshold in this kind of investigations).

Based on those criteria they end up with a global list of 106 civil wars in the period 1816 - 1980 (49 in the period 1946 - 1980). China with 11, and Colombia and Spain both with 7 civil wars top the list. The 106 civil wars together claimed 9 million battle-deaths and had a duration of 3000 nation-months. China, Nigeria, Spain, USA and Russia top the list of casualties. They remark “almost all civil wars was between members of the same ethnic or linguistic family” (ibid., p. 233), but do not specify what they mean by ethnic or linguistic family. During the same period they list 67 interstate and 51 imperial wars, with a duration of 6000 nation-months claiming 31 million battle-deaths; 1917 and 1943 were the most war-intense years, and First and Second World Wars the bloodiest wars of the period. Europeans were by far the most war-prone. They conclude that all tendencies to an increase in number, duration, severity or intensity for interstate as well as civil wars through the period 1816 - 1980 disappear if the figures are normalised for the growth in size of the nation state system.

In a similar vein Margareta Sollenberg and Peter Wallensteen from SIPRI define a ‘major armed conflict’ of which there occurred 31, waged on 27 locations in 1994, as “prolonged combat between the military forces of two or more governments, or of one government and at least one organised armed group, and incurring battle-related deaths of at least 1000 people during the entire conflict.”
They define the conflicts in terms of two types of incompatibility: “contested, incompatible positions regarding government (i.e., the type of political system or a change of central government or its composition) and territory (i.e., control of territory, secession or autonomy).” (ibid., p. 21). This is very sensible and could equal ‘revolutionary’ and ‘ethnic’ civil wars. But closer inspection opens up some problems. Basically the reasoning behind both the definitions of Small and Singer and SIPRI (and all realist writing) is the unitary nation state, which has been the dominant state-form in most of the twentieth century. But if precisely the apparent proliferation of civil wars today signals a transformation of this state, it may signal the need of a transformation of our thinking about the ‘Westphalian’ state too. At this stage I will only point to some obvious problems arising from the transfer of concepts from the study of interstate war to civil war.

The Table 1A of conflicts in 1994 (ibid., p. 28ff) lists the state territory on which the conflicts take place, type of incompatibility, longevity of conflict, participating armies, their numerical strengths, total deaths, deaths in 1994 and change from 1993. This procedure is developed from listing interstate wars, characterised by rough symmetricality between armies, relatively short duration, battle-related deaths being the majority of all conflict-related deaths, contending parties being identifiable armies, and finally located within existing states. However, what their table documents is an alien world with a wild inequality in strength between large national armies like the Turkish or Indian and minute guerrilla groups. This produces a picture of an impossible conventional war. Sollenberg and her team know of course very well that the war in Turkey is a guerrilla war and only a fraction of the Turkish army of 600,000 is deployed against the 12,000 PKK guerrillas, but it is not reflected in the table.

Another striking feature of the listed conflicts are their extreme longevity, which again pictures a war radically different from a conventional war with a beginning and a definite end. These conflicts seem to be both unwinnable and unstoppable, hinting at a state structure very different from the textbook unitary nation state which should not be able to accommodate an ongoing war on its territory for decades.

The criterion of ‘organized armed group’ excludes conflicts with groups that do not resist in a military fashion. Thus the victims of the Rwanda massacre do
not appear in the yearbook as “these were not immediately related to the respective parties [Hutu ‘extremists’ and the Rwanda Patriotic Front] and the incompatibility.” (ibid., p. 22). This is a very unfortunate skewing of the dynamics of the conflict and clearly indicates that the criteria used are problematic to say the least.

A very grave political and theoretical problem is the misleading low casualties stemming from the criteria of ‘battle-related’ deaths. Adam Rotfeld is justified in calling for a more inclusive concept of security, and this certainly should be extended to the statistics as well. A pressing example is populations confronted with states deliberately using hunger as an instrument of war. This is well documented for Ethiopia among other places. (Macrea, 1996). The root of the problem is not technical-statistical but how the state-at-war is perceived: what are the limits to ‘battle-related’ violence in a civil war: deaths by bombs, bullets, machetes, or empty plates? An example of the magnitude of the problem is the discrepancy between the SIPRI 1993 entry for Afghanistan quoting the total deaths as “1,000,000 (estimated direct and indirect deaths 1978-1990).” (SIPRI 1993:123) versus the SIPRI 1995 entry for Afghanistan now two years later quoting the total deaths for 1978 - 1994 as “> 14,000.” (SIPRI 1995:31).

Finally, collapsed states without a government pose a serious problem for categorising civil wars according to SIPRI’s criteria insisting on at least one government being party to the conflict. Clearly there was a civil war raging in Afghanistan in 1992, to take but one example, and the 1993 Yearbook add to the entry for Afghanistan: “No general ‘vs’ or Govt. can be distinguished for the entire year 1992.” (SIPRI 1993:123), so strictu sensu it is debatable whether Afghanistan should be on the list at all - or the criteria are deficient.

My discussion of SIPRI should not be read as a critique of the important and very useful work they are doing, nor of the quality of their findings. On the contrary, to finds these problems even in SIPRI’s work should alert us to fundamental shortcomings in the realist understanding of civil war. So are there any better alternatives? This is not an easy question to answer.

(iii) the idea of civil war

Civil war is a self-contradictory term. How can war be civil; how can the civil be war? John Keane argues that we should drop the term ‘civil war’ in favour
of 'uncivil war', “It would be a scandalous euphemism to call them civil wars... today’s battle zones are best described as a new type of uncivil war.” (Keane 1996:137). But is that a good solution? On the face of it, ‘uncivil war’ has a somewhat platitudinal ring; in a broad sense any war is ‘uncivil’, and thus the distinction between war as a general phenomenon and civil war as a particular phenomenon is lost. *Civil war, guerre civile, guerra civil, bürgerkrieg, borgerkrig, inbördeskrig, grasjdanskij voina;* all keep the contradiction between civil and war. I think it is important to keep the contradiction, because it is here we find the key to what civil war is.

How does civil become war? Not by annihilating civility or the civilians, or even civilisation, but by revealing the complementarity of *civitas* and violence. To grasp the historical phenomena of civil wars it is important not just to concentrate on their terrifying, bloody, violent features. Civil war should not be equated with Hobbes' brutish stateless condition. Even the most horrible recent slaughters in Rwanda were not just that; they also revealed the *civitas* of Rwanda. The antonym to war is not civil but peace; and the antonym to civil is not war but violence. Civil war is not just violence amongst humans, individuals, but people bonded in a particular way by war. They are part of a community, and not any community, but of a state; they are interpellated persons, 'civilised' human beings being always already part of a *civitas*.

Accordingly, all definitions of civil war can be summed up in three components: the parts, the splitting up, and the whole\(^1\). Most modern attempts at an explanation of civil war have started with the parts (the individual rebel), proceeded to the splitting up (the rebellious assertion of an angry, frustrated, pathological, etc. individuality), but rarely spent too much energy on the whole because "society" was taken as an linear aggregate of individuals\(^2\). In my view, however, the whole should be the point of departure for an attempt to unravel the contradiction between civil and war: How can you be part of a community and at the same time wage war against it; what are the historical and structural limits to internal violence before the unity of the *civitas* breaks down? Nation and national unity cannot be taken for granted but


often are in circular arguments like the United States or Nigeria escaped undivided from their civil wars because they were strong nations. But what constitutes the cohesiveness of a national entity despite and beyond the ravage of civil war? How can the nation state be an entity when it is deeply divided by war? What is the source of the civic strength that can bond a war and keep it a civil war? And on the other hand, what can make the bond snap and turn civil war into interstate war? Or how can a re-united entity emerge from a cessation of hostilities?

The pre-modern understanding of civil war was 'holistic'. One can discern at least two strands in the development of the concept of civil war, (i) from the ancient Greek concept of stasis; and (ii) from the medieval concept of insurgentia. They both share the view that civil war is the breaking apart of what is ment to be together, but the differ radically on what nature of the whole was.

a) Stasis.

Aristotle ment that man was a political animal, and therefore organised himself in the polis. The unity of the free men and their individual wills was expressed in the common will to defend the polis. The opposite to unity was stasis, factional fight or forms of civil war. Stasis was the central concept for breaking apart the whole in Ancient Greece. "All levels of intensity [of political struggle] were embraced by the splendid Greek portmanteau-word stasis. When employed in a social-political context, stasis had a broad range of meanings, from political grouping or rivalry through faction (in its pejorative sense) to open civil war." (Finley 1983:105). In his detailed account of stasis in 5th and 4th century Greece, Gehrke notes on the instrumentalities of political struggle that, "Verhaftungen, Verbannungen, Tötungen, Ent-eignungen und Verfassungsänderungen waren die gebräuchlichsten Mittel." (Gehrke 1985:266-67). Stasis was a common occurrence in Greece, which both Gerhke and Lintott describe in detail. Later, in

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13 Stasis is translated into Danish in J.C. Berg’s complete Græsk-Dansk Ordbog, København 1864, as: “a, Opstillen; 2a, Staaen, Faststaen; 2b, Stilling, som En indtager, Standpunkt, Plads; 2c, Tilstand, Stilling, Beskaffenhed, politisk Stilling, sædelig Tilstand; 2d, Opstand, Oprør, Partiskiften, ogsaa politisk Parti, derfor overhovedet Strid, Tvedragt, om selve det oprørske Parti; 2e, Skare.” [2d, rebellion, revolt, change of party, the political party, thus strife, dissent, the rebellious party itself]

14 See also Lintott's lively account of civil wars in Ancient Greece, "In the Classical Period of the city state the centre of any stasis was for the most part a small group of powerful men at loggerheads with one or more other groups." (Lintott, 1982:82). Finley is rather critical of Lintott’s use of the sources.
Rome the unity of the *civitas* was broken by *bellum civile*. One of the famous descriptions is Julius Cæsar's book *De belle civile* about his campaign against Pompius in the year 49 BC\(^{15}\). But unity was nevertheless the baseline of the *polis* or *civitas*, attainable with political wisdom and prudence in this life. Sparta had three hundred years without *stasis*. Unity was not an ideal condition only to be reached in Paradise.

b) *Insurgentia.*

The medieval community of men was not anything resembling the Greek *polis*, or the modern notion of a nation, but the kingdom of God. Before classes, before lords came upon the Earth, there existed a Paradise given by God, where all men were equal. A sermon text attributed to the radical priest John Ball, one of the leaders of the great English peasant rising of 1381 expresses this, “Whan Adam dalf and Eve span... wo was thanne a gentilman” (Hilton 1973:211)\(^{16}\). The uprising was understood by John Ball as fundamentally re-active, an undoing of wrongs and the re-creation of the true Christian community, the Paradise Lost by the fall from grace and the Paradise Promised by Jesus Christ. “We pray that all bonde men may be made ffre for god made all ffre wt his precious blode sheddyng.” (From a petition by Robert Kett and his followers, 1549; Hilton 1972:8). *Insurgentia* was caused by a pre-historical divide of men into classes, and it was legitimated by the final struggle which would abolish classes and herald the lasting post-historical peace.

*Insurgentia*, in the shape of Bauernkrieg, Jaquerie, rebellion, or revolution is of course the roots of Marxist notions of class struggle and world revolution. Expressed a bit anachronistic: 'the mother of all wars' was the war between the classes and thus the abolition of classes would guarantee an end to war. This wonderful promise was repeated again and again by the socialist movement; Proudhon said “Le seul risque de guerre:... le pauperisme” (Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, p. 610); and the Second Internationale declared in Zürich 1893, “Mit der Aufhebung der Klassenherrschaft verschwindet auch der Krieg. Der Sturz des Kapitalismus (der historisch letzten mit einer Klassen-gesellschaft verzahnten Wirtschaftsordnung) ist der Weltfriede.” (ibid., p. 611). Karl Marx said the

\(^{15}\) I. M. Finley mentions the civil wars of Rome in the last years of the Republic, Finley 1983:117.

\(^{16}\) The relation of The English Rising of 1381 to the development of the state is considered in my *History of the State*, Vol 1, p. 187-218.
workers had no fatherland: proletarians of all countries unite! Every socialist had hoped to avoid the war by invoking the international solidarity of working men destined to become cannon-fodder for the imperialists. But on August 4, 1914, the SPD voted yes to the war, and on that day, only 66 years after the Communist Manifesto, the German Kaiser could declare, “I know of no classes, only Germans!” Beyond the millions killed in World War One one victim of was the insurgentia concept of civil war. The World War killed the eschatological meaning of Insurgentia as the ultimate terminator of war. ‘Revolutionary’ civil war was reduced to a noble hope and a prostituted Comintern frase. In Spain only two decades later civil war was the confusing label put on a terrible war where communists fought against revolutionary fascists to restore a bourgeois republic.

c) La Guerre Civile.

For reasons still hotly debated amongst historians the development of the state took divergent paths from Antiquity in West, Central and East Europe. In France and England an early development of territorial states began bonding secular communities of men. In the emerging territorial states of early modern Europe civil war got or regained a meaning echoing the classical republican notion of bellum civile, and very different from the Christian-eschatological notion. Now whom should ‘act in concert’, was not the religious, millinaristic whole of God’s children, and not yet the citizens of a nation17, but the sovereign of the realm. Civil war came to be seen as a strife internal to the King’s body politic, the corpus reipublicae mysticum elevated from subject classes below and separated from neighbouring sovereign nations18. Christine de Pizan describes it very aptly in her epistle to the French king, Lamentacion sur les maux de la guerre civile from 1410: “Oh noble French princes...where is now the sweet natural blood among you...the noble knights and youth of France, all of one nature, one single soul and body, which used to defend the crown and public good, are now gathered in a shameful battle...father against father, brother against brother...and what will follow, in God’s name? Famine...from which will spring revolts by the people which has been too often robbed...by soldiers, subversion in the towns because of outrageous taxes which will

17 Hannah Arendt, On Violence, 1970:44; where she expressly links the polis with the republican revolutions of modern Europe.
have to be levied...and above all, the English will obtain checkmate on the side..”
(Pizan 1410:85-87). The conflict between peasants and nobles had nothing to do
with civil war for her.

Since early modern times the concept of guerre civile developed as a
reflection of the contested transformation of the royal sovereign into the popular
sovereign: creation of citizens inside national boundaries. Two century after
Christine de Pizan, Thomas Hobbes' concept of civil war was the natural condition,
"one against every one", where the life of man is "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and
short" before the social, before the community, as in savage America. (Hobbes
1996:82ff, Chapter xiii). So when Hobbes describes a situation of brutish warre it
can not at the same time be a description of civil-war, war within the commonwealth,
because the commonwealth is defined as the remedy against war of one against
every one. "The only way to erect such a common power, as may be able to defend
them from the invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of one another... is to confer
all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men... This
done, the multitude so united in one person, is called a COMMONWEALTH, in
Latin CIVITAS. This is the generation of the great LEVIATHAN." (ibid., 114). Yet
this does not explain the contradiction of civil-war, because one may ask: how can
the citizen remain a citizen and yet wage war against the Commonwealth? Twentieth
century positivist philosophy of law solved the dilemma by negating civil war
altogether. It was now an individual problem, not a state problem, if people rebelled
they must be deviant, sick, too violent. It was a practical problem for the police to
stop and became a job for psychiatrists or to answer why men rebel.

(iv) interpellation and civil war

To deny war the appellation civil will not dissolve the noxious compound of
civil-war. To go from violence to war we need to move beyond the insights in
Keane's essay on how violence obstructs and destroys the civil to how violence
becomes creative. How violence creates states.

Althusser’s notion of “interpellation” has been linked to Hegel’s theory
of “struggle for recognition” and Clausewitz’ theory of war by the late Anders
Boserup and a small band of his neo-Hegelian students. Thomas Højrup’s book
“Omkring livsformsanalysens udvikling” [Towards the development of the
analysis of life-forms] is the most elaborate, if hermetic, formulation of this neo-
Hegelian anti-realist and anti-sociological standpoint yet published in Denmark. In the English summary he writes: “From considering the state as an association of individuals, classes or institutions, based on the maintenance of internal functions in the individual society, a basic idea since Hobbes reintroduced functionalism in the social sciences, the state should rather be seen as a sovereignty-maintaining and recognised member of a state system. Instead of viewing the state from below and from inside out, it must be viewed from without and above... Without the struggle for recognition or defensive war, there is no mutual recognition of sovereignty or state system. Without sovereignty there is no state. The state concept’s other theoretical determinants, its predicates, presuppose this defence capability and from a theoretical point of view derive from it.” (Højrup 1995:211). The challenge for Højrup then is to show how the state (the independent subject) is able to interpellate society within (the dependent subjects) against internal resistance in order to defend its sovereignty against competing states. How to conceptualise a clash of interests between the state and citizens or groups of citizens? The dominating theme in Højrup’s book is to present the theory of "survival of the superior defence", and civil war is only mentioned once in a brief sentence. In my view however, the notion of interpellation can support a theory of civil war; and it is possible to transport this notion from Althusser’s theoretical environment of class struggle to a neo-Hegelian environment of a state-system totality.

For Althusser interpellation is the process by which the state creates its subjects as subjects. He writes in his famous article from 1970, "As a first formulation I shall say: all ideology hails or interpellates individuals as concrete subjects." and he provides the well-known example of the police hailing: "Hey, you there!" The individual in the street will turn around. "By this... he becomes a subject. Why? Because he has recognised that the hail was "really" addressed to him, and that "it was really him who was hailed." He becomes a subject for state because he recognises himself in the hail. This recognition is what Althusser calls ideology.

20 In spite of Althusser's express protests, "On a number of occasions I have insisted on the revolutionary character of the Marxist conception of the 'social whole' in so far as it is distinct from the Hegelian 'totality'. (Althusser 1970:104-5).
"The existence of ideology and the hailing or interpellation of individuals as subjects are one and the same thing." Now, the policeman is not hailing as an individual, he is the voice of the state, of what Althusser terms the central Subject interpellating everybody. This is a formulation of how the whole or the one-ness of the state exists; we may say that the central Subject only exists when everybody are interpellated. The ideology of the state or the idea of the nation exists only insofar as the state interpellates its subjects. In Althusser's notion of interpellation the state can hail its subjects both by ideology (in the 'ideological state apparatuses' belonging both to the public and private spheres) and repression (in the state apparatuses centrally commanded by the state).

Althusser then remarks, "I might add: what thus seems to take place outside ideology (to be precise, in the street), in reality takes place in ideology. What really takes place in ideology seems therefore to take place outside it... Ideology has no outside (for itself), but at the same time that it is nothing but outside (for science and reality)." (ibid., 130-31). What is the crucial point here? Not so much the science-ideology opposition, which Althusser himself stresses, but something which is obscured completely by his general concept of class struggle. The outside which ideology does not have for itself, and the reality of which it is nothing but outside, is the violence which in the first place creates the topography of the state. In a note Althusser defines topography as "a definite space [representing] the respective sites occupied by several realities: thus the economic is at the bottom (the base), the superstructure above it." (ibid., 139, emp. L.A.). Of course, a topography can be structured differently from base-superstructure. In a moment I shall suggest a non-abstract topography based on the relation between human body and space.

However, the crucial point is that the space of the state, of interpellation, is limited, and the violence creating the limits in reality, are outside of ideology, of interpellation. The policeman's hail works only inside the cultural sphere of the national community, within the reach of the law. The boundary is created by the war amongst states. Althusser locates the ultimate social contradiction in class struggle; the neo-Hegelians in the struggle between states; this allows for a much more satisfactory, I think, understanding of interpellation. I use, then, Althusser’s concept of interpellation without buying the schema of class struggle or the 'Marxist theory of the class-state' as Althusser puts it forward in his article; or Højrup's own quasi-Althusserian "livsforms-analyse".
(v) a typology of civil war

a) Violence and power.

My starting point for understanding civil war is the relation between human body and territory. Michel Foucault develops Althusser's 'topography of power' into a tangible universe of strategy and combat, “There are no relations of power without resistances; the latter are all the more real and effective because they are formed right at the point where relations of power are exercised.” (Foucault 1980:143). Inspired by Foucault anthropologists claim persuasively that power have to touch the body to affect it; the human body is the arena for state interpellation (Graziano, 1992; Feldman, 1991). We can also say that power defines, and exists by ordering human bodies spatially behind fronts on a territory. But in order better to understand the spatial dimensions of power and the limits to this approach, I think it is necessary - and possible - to combine Foucault’s important insight into the territoriality of power with Hannah Arendt’s categorical separation of power and violence. "It is insufficient to say that power and violence are not the same. Power and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it ends in power’s disappearance.” (Arendt 1970:56). She would not agree that power is “a multiform production of relations of domination” (Foucault 1980:143), but stress that power springs from “the human ability to act in concert” (Arendt 1970:44). However, the distinction between power and violence will not negate the concept of the territoriality of power but contribute a necessary precision.

Coercive violence flows from the state and manifests itself in territorial boundaries. "Violence obstructs subjects' bodily motion.. [violence is] the unwanted physical interference by groups and/or individuals with the bodies of others.. [and] death is the potentially ultimate consequence of violence." (Keane 1996:67-69). I will adopt this restrictive definition of violence, because it is specific (unlike Johan Galtung's) and in agreement with my spatial understanding of power. Discursive power develops inside legitimate boundaries and produces justification of state violence; it is a circle, a never-ending historical process turning over and over. For

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22 This section is a summary of the discussion of the territoriality of power put forward in my working paper Winnie Mandala's Banning Order and the Territoriality of Power and Political Violence, (Tin, 1996).
the individual the circle starts in the second movement, from the position of interpellated object in the always-already marked out symbolic space. But for the state it is opposite. For the state the circle starts with the first movement, from the position of interpellating Subject positioned as it is, in the ever on-going war with other states, that is the never-ever marked out space of real violence. All revolutions, all new spaces of meaning have limits, borders, rubbing against other older spaces of meaning. The first movement in the circle is silent, coercive violence bounding the community, the second is talking, discursive power imagining the community. It may be easier to record talk than silence, and that may explain why so much more has been written on the second movement than on the first (on discursive communities, on nationalism etc. rather than on war). In this paper I will be exploring the silent, coercive movement and not touch upon the talking, communicative movement.

b) Territories of power.

Now, the modern nation state cannot be understood as a single power space, nor as a single symbolic space. It is structured as several superimposed grids that all have their distinct spatial realities. Each grid gets marked in space by violence that produces borders, and each grid bounds distinct discursive communities. I will argue that we can discern a four-layered grid of power relations in any nation-state. The units in each of the four grids are: (i) states; (ii) ethnic space; (iii) towns; (iv) household space. It is important not to lose sight of the fact that the spaces or grids we are talking about all are territorial realities ordering and bordering human bodies. Each grid is defined by a specific relation between territory and the essential markers of the human body.

The relation between nation-state space and human body is pragmatic: practically everybody living on the state-territory are part of the nation; it is an inclusive relation, nation follows state.

The ethnic space can range from small groups to religious and ethnic communities. The relation between ‘ethnic’ space (I use this as a catch-all term) and human body is essential: whatever references are used to index bodies - race, creed, language, descent, purpose - only the pure, the clean bodies has the inherent right to live on the soil; it is an exclusive relation, state follows ethnicity.
The relation between urban space and human body is functional: there is no state and no nation, but only the infinite exchangeable relations of producers and consumers of commodities, that is 'classes'.

The relation finally between household space and human body is organic: revealed by birth and defined by society as sex and age-group; relations of the blood.23

Any single individual person lives in all spaces at the same time, say, in a house, and in a town, and in an ethnic space, and in a state. My point, yet unproved, is that inside each space a particular discourse is hegemonic: in the house the discourses of gender and age; in the town discourses of class and function; in ethnic space discourse of ethnicity (including religion); and in the state, confronted with other states, the discourse of nationalism. For the state to maintain its defensive capability in this environment it must polarise social power between the fronts of the state and the house: that is at the border of the 'private sphere', and at the international boundary. And it must reduce power at the fronts of the town and the ethnic space, which always threaten state power with 'class-struggle' and ethnic rebellion.

The grids are superimposed on each other and interact both on the level of historical events and long wave structure. The nation state interpellates not just free-floating individuals, but individuals structured by historic forces other than the state. The point is that they have different historical roots and trajectories and cannot be reduced to one overriding logic like ‘modernity’, 'class-struggle, or 'ethnicity'; quite distinct historical forces are at work simultaneously with different origins, different modes of interpellating the individual, and very different promises for the future.

c) Civil war defined as citizens attacking the state.

Interpellation is always violent in the last instance. When it comes to survival the state will use violence against its citizens. Between the state and the citizen or any group of citizens, a condition of potential or explosive violence reigns. If we look closer at the power-relations between state, ethnic space, town, and house we will notice a fundamental hierarchy: state at the top, house at the bottom, and ethnic space and town in the middle. In periods of peace and tranquillity there is an

23 For a slightly fuller account of the spatiality of power, see my “Magtens rum, staten, stammen, byen og huset” [The Spaces of Power: the State, the Tribe, the Town, and the House]. Centre for Cultural Research, Århus University, Workingpaper no. 42-97, Århus 1997.
equilibrium of power, but ethnic space, town, and house must always be ready to defend themselves against attacks from the state.

It is essential to distinguish between attack and defence. Attack is conditional, but defence is unconditional. As the nation state has grown during the last two hundred years the sub-state spaces have proved their will to exist variously from country to country by defending themselves against state encroachments. However the attacker/defender relation can be reversed if the meaning of violence is reversed. We call it political violence, terrorism, crime, rebellion, subversion, revolution; the actual shot in the street can be the same, but the meaning is contested\textsuperscript{24}. The notions of ‘defender’ and ‘attacker’ originates in discourse, not in violence itself. It is only by analysing the full historical cycle of violence-boundary-discourse-violence that the positions of defender and attacker can be ascertained. When house, town, and ethnic space attack the state, and violently contest interpellation they reverse the meaning of violence between state and citizens; they wage civil war.

\textbf{d) Typology of civil wars.}

A full exploration of civil war would include the following three steps: first a typology of civil wars based on weapons used by the state attackers; secondly an investigation of how violence creates territorial borders of states, ethnic spaces, towns, and houses; and thirdly tracing how discourses develop inside each of these overlapping spaces, producing legitimacy for the use of violence. If this procedure is developed sufficiently historically specific it may deliver the framework for policy recommendations\textsuperscript{25}.

In any case, to develop a typology of civil wars in nation-states we must first find a procedure to define whether a given episode of violence is a civil war at all. I will suggest four empirical parameters: (i) locality of violence; (ii) intensity of violence; (iii) meaning of violence; and (iv) technologies of violence.

(i) Locality of violence.

\textsuperscript{24} Violence in South Africa and the South African academic discussion of violence is a good example of the ambiguities of ‘political violence’; see my discussion in, \textit{Winnie...} (Tin, 1996).

\textsuperscript{25} In this paper, however, I have only taken the first step; I am currently working on steps two and three with my study of South Africa in the years 1976 - 1986 - 1996.
All states must enforce a boundary between internal order and external chaos. Civil war is war inside this boundary. Civil war is not unique to nation-states; in various kinds of states like tribal polities and empires the boundary differs from frontiers to borders and the historical dynamic of civil war will differ accordingly.

(ii) Intensity of violence.

I will use SIPRI’s purely functional definition of war-intensity as “the battle-related deaths of at least 1000 people during the entire conflict.” (SIPRI 1995:21) adding that “battle-related deaths” can include killings caused by deprivation, deliberate hunger and genocide.

(iii) Meaning of violence.

Whether any specific episode of violence inside a nation-state killing more than 1000 people in the final analysis is a civil war can only be determined by analysis of the meaning of violence. i.e. by the discursive embedding of violence in the specific case. Civil war is a historical episode where the direction and logic of nation-state interpellation of society is reversed; the state turns from being the attacker of ethnic space, town and house, to defending itself against attacks from ethnic space, town and house.

(iv) Technologies of violence.

An episode of violence determined as civil war can now be classified. The most complex technology of violence used by the attacker should be used to classify a civil war because there is an assumed definite relation between complexity of weapon and complexity of the social organisation needed to field them against the state. It should be noted that the types of weapons used by the state in defending itself cannot be used to classify civil war because they do not necessarily reflect the development of the state-attacking group or the seriousness of the reversal of meaning. My notion of the weapon as signifier for social complexity differs fundamentally from the now ridiculed technology-first ideas like the stirrup being the cause of Mongol power or the wheeled plough being the reason for change in

26 The anthropologist Marshall D. Sahlins is well-known for his work connecting warfare and cultural development, taking the Americans Indians as his case. He writes, "Using a general perspective, however, we classify types of warfare as representatives of stages in the overall development of that aspect of culture, and then trace the progressive trends in war as they unfold through successive stages." Marshall D. Sahlins, Evolution: Specific and General. in M.D. Sahlins and E.R. Service, eds.: Evolution and Culture. The University of Michigan Press. Ann Arbor, 1960.
Medieval Europe. I do not take the weapon as the cause of social structure, but as a signifier. Yet, every weapon does have a technological horizon, that materially effect the strategic possibilities of any army and thus the war-fighting capability of any state. At the same time to field a particular weapon takes a certain degree of societal development and historical conjecture. But since a historical conjecture has an infinite number of predicates, and societal development very many, while a class of weapons has only few predicates, I suggest using the weapon as a key to the two-way relation between weapon and society.

I will now propose the following four classes of weapons:

Household weapons
Light weapons
Heavy weapons
Air- and seaborne weapons

Defined very briefly: household weapons are household items that become weapons by being used violently against other persons; light weapons are every weapon that can be carried by a person on foot; heavy weapons are all land based weapons above light weapons; air and seaborne weapons are the rest. It is important to note that these categories are cumulative: when you use heavy weapons you do not stop using light weapons; the heavy weapon is added to the light weapon. But it is still the most complex weapon deployed by the attackers which determines the type of war fought. Following the logic of the weapon as a signifier of the social and political sophistication of the group using them we can study the specific strategic possibilities inherent in each type of weapons, their effectiveness in attacking the state in rural and urban areas, how they relate to forms of internal organisation and political movements, external states, etc. I will argue that it is possible, reasonable unambiguously to link a specific type of civil war to each type of weapon. The four classes of weapons will then designate the following four different types of civil war:

Household weapons ------------------------ Intifada
Light weapons--------------------------Guerrilla war
Heavy weapons--------------------------Frontal civil war
Air- and seaborne weapons------Inverse civil war
In an intifada no light, heavy, or airborne weapons are used by the attacker; in guerrilla war household and light weapons, but no heavy or airborne weapons are used; in frontal civil war all weapons except airborne are used; and in inverse civil war all four classes of weapons are used. One of the important questions this typology may be able to answer is how, if at all, conflicts escalate up through the weapons range, or if it is possible to discern other patterns? Another important question will be the territoriality of the four types of civil wars: are they linked in a systematic way with the fronts of house, town, ethnic, and state spaces. A particular test for the typology will be whether it can shed light on the how different civil wars relate to the cities.

However, attacks on the state using the four classes of weapons resulting in the four types of civil wars historically progress from sub-war levels of violence, and only in certain historical circumstances reach a war-level. We can thus more accurately understand the four types of civil wars as each running through a low-to-high range of intensity and at a certain point turning from a sub-war conflict into war. The full typology of civil wars including the sub-war range will look like this:

**Household Weapons:**
- Riot --------------------------------------------- Intifada

**Light Weapons:**
- Terrorism ---------------------------------- Guerrilla War

**Heavy Weapons:**
- Coup ------------------------------------ Frontal Civil War

**Air- and Seaborne Weapons:**
- Humanitarian Intervention ----- Inverse Civil War

With the full typology we can ask more complex question closer to the actual historical escalation of a crisis into civil war: are there several beginnings, for example, to a frontal war? Can it equally well start with a riot or terrorism or a coup, or are there definite links along the same weapons type, i.e. between coup and frontal civil war? And what about possible intermediate types?

**II. HOUSEHOLD WEAPONS**

Household weapons can be defined as objects that are readily available for everyone like rocks, stones, urban scrap, kitchen and farm tools, rods, sticks, petrol
and bottles, tyres, car wrecks and so on. They only become weapons by being used violently against other persons. Hunting rifles and small arms in everyday possession of the public belong to the category of household weapons as do “traditional weapons”, but they are insignificant in attacks on the state compared with other household weapons.

Attacks on the state possible with household weapons range from a flash riot to the sustained uprising, intifada. I have chosen this word (Edward W. Said notes in passing that this is the only Arabic word to enter the vocabulary of twentieth-century world politics; Said 1989:5) as a generic term for the maximum attack on the state possible with household weapons.

(i) riot

The flash riot is a powerful threat to the state, even with its very short duration because it instantly reverses the meaning of violence between state and citizen. Intifada is the creation of a grassroots-organised urban population with a specific combination of young front-line groups willing to engage state riot-forces and a supportive rear difficult to penetrate by state coin-troops. This can lead to precarious libered areas and sporadic double-power situations, as it happened in some townships in South Africa 1985-86. Both riot and intifada are urban forms of violence, manufactured weapons are not used, and a centralised organisation are not important and can in some ways compromise the resilience of decentralised actions to state counter-insurgency measures.

(ii) intifada

All this sets intifada apart from guerrilla-war, which is rural, armed and strictly organised. Normal counter-insurgency measures used against guerrilla armies are ineffectual against the intifada; the population cannot be relocated away from the 'insurgents', the intifada will always be ‘armed’, there is no central organisation to crush. On the other hand is it impossible for the intifada to conquer the state with household weapons. The result is a stand-off, with the state continually violently harassing the population, and the population continually discursively reaffirming the illegitimacy of state.

III. LIGHT WEAPONS

Light weapons basically comprise two groups, explosives and military issue light weapons regardless of technological sophistication. There is no standard
definition of small arms and light weapons. Chris Smith in the SIPRI Yearbook 1995 uses the following working definition: ‘Light weapons’ refers to crew-portable land-based armaments. This definition includes small arms such as pistols, rifles, assault rifles and sub-machine-guns; light weapons and medium machine-guns, heavy machine-guns (HMG) with a calibre not exceeding 14.5 mm; anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles; light mortars; mines and grenades.” (Smith 1995:581). These weapons are normally not available in households, and should be distinguished from firearms used for private sport and self-protection purposes. They are, on the other hand, relatively easy to procure for militant groups on the international market, steal from military stockpiles etc. With their abundance, relatively high firepower and unlimited mobility they represent the second level of technological-social organisation of violence.

Attacks on the state possible with light weapons range from isolated terrorist bombings and assassinations to sustained guerrilla war.

(i) terrorism

Both the PLO and the ANC attempted to wage armed struggle against the state, and they developed organisational structures to do this. It is important not to confuse these attempts with the intifada violence. The dynamics in the two types of attack on the state are very different. While the intifada draws its strength from a spontaneous and widespread open participation, the armed struggle on the contrary draws its strength from secrecy and centralised command, military training of small groups and careful execution of attacks on the superior armed state. The combination of intifada and armed struggle posed fundamental problems both for PLO and the ANC.

Terrorism and guerrilla war are degrees on a continuum of light weapons attacks on the state. While particular conflicts can move on this line, it demands a qualitative jump to change weapons-type down to household weapons or up to heavy weapons. Such a jump is only possible by radically changed political circumstances, as we saw it in South Africa.

(ii) guerrilla war

Guerrilla war has wrongly been understood as a particular 'political' kind of war with Mao’s proverbial guerrilla forces swimming as a fishes in the sea of the people. In fact this is a very inaccurate rendering of Mao’s writings on guerrilla war. Guerrilla war is first and foremost an asymmetrical war between the state and
groups attacking the state. Henry Kissinger once remarked that a guerrilla force wins if it does not loose, while a conventional force looses if it does not win. And William Zartman writes in his introduction to *Elusive Peace. Negotiating an end to Civil Wars*, “The most striking characteristic of internal conflict is its asymmetry: one party (government) is strong and the other (insurgents) is weak.” (Zartman 1995:7). This is not altogether true, as he can see in another book he has contributed to, Licklider 1993, in the chapter dealing with the American civil war. This civil war was *not* a guerrilla civil war and it was not asymmetrical - even if one side in the end proved to be the strongest - but a frontal civil war. (Stedman, 1993). Asymmetricality is not the *differentia specifica* of civil war; only of the three other types of civil war, i.e. intifada, guerrilla war, and inverse civil war.

Any ‘small’ war as the Spanish term puts it will be characterised by Mao’s three basic parameters of asymmetricality: the army of the state attackers is much inferior to the army of the state, their base area exists but is very small, and the political power of the state attackers are still far from that of a fully fledged state; this is the I will argue that all three fundamental socio-political limitations of the state attackers are summed up in their restriction to light weapons. The kind of weapons used is an indicator of what type of civil war is being fought. Thus a civil war where the state is attacked by light weapons only will be a guerrilla war with its special strategic conditions. How to wage a sustained asymmetrical war has been the basic strategic problem solved by successful guerrilla commanders in history; how to win a guerrilla war has not yet been solved.

An American academic once wrote, “In the Eastern [Chinese] revolution [the revolutionaries] withdraw from central, urban areas of the country, establish a base area of control in a remote section, struggle to win support of the peasants through terror and propaganda, slowly expand the scope of their authority, and gradually escalate the level of their military operations from individual terrorist attacks to guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare and regular warfare. Eventually they are able to defeat the government troops in battle. The last phase of the revolutionary struggle is occupation of the capital.” 27 Samuel Huntington’s reading of the Chinese revolution is a one-dimensional stages-of-growth of civil war, which, I think, does not fit well with historical realities. There was *not* a single interdependent growth of military pressure and political gains leading back to expanded military

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pressure and so on. The jump from light to heavy weapons was borne by a radically altered political situation not created by the guerrilla war. The political change originated in an arena much larger the theatre of military guerrilla action. Dick Wilson gives a very positive account of Mao in his book on the Long March, but nevertheless concludes, “The Japanese occupation of Manchuria gave the Communists their chance to disarm the Koumintang, to court the warlords, to consolidate their Sensi base and to plan more thoroughly their blueprint for taking over China. One cannot see, looking back over the decades, any other deus ex machina which might have saved the Shensi soviet base from collapse at the hands of an ultimate Kuomintang encirclement in 1936 or 1937.”(Wilson 1971:279). It was Mao’s own assessment too. When Kakuei Tanaka visited China in 1972, and attempted to apologise for Tokyo’s war crimes, Mao said the Japanese invasion had been a good thing; without it the Communists would never have won power and he would not be greeting the Japanese Prime Minister. (TLS, October 25, 1996).

IV . HEAVY WEAPONS

Heavy weapons can be defined as every land-based weapon above the level of light weapons (as defined above), and below the level of airborne, seaborne or atomic weapons. A typical heavy weapon like a tank is a highly sophisticated piece of technology with great destructive capacity signifying the complex social-industrial organisation necessary for their production, the powerful state-military organisation necessary for their procurement and finally the diversified army necessary for their effective deployment. Heavy weapons have evolved since World War Two as the centrepiece of a non-guerrilla strategy of frontal or conventional warfare. Heavy weapons are developed today for high-tech, high-speed inter-state warfare, integrating air forces like in the Golf-War, which differs from the low-tech, low-speed intra-state deployment in frontal civil war without air force\(^2\).

Heavy weapons represent the third level of technological-social organisation of violence. The attack possible on the state with heavy weapons range from coup to frontal civil war.

(i) coup

\(^2\) See Fredriksen 1994 for a one of the rare participations of Danish officers in academic debate; their critique of Paul Virilio’s far-fetched dromological theories is very reasonable.
Acts of violence including use of heavy weapons like armoured vehicles, canons and tanks in all cases depend on pre-existing army stocks. The use of heavy weapons in a coup imply a pin-point geography, with attacks on central discursive installations like airports, TV-stations, government buildings, a symbolic battle culminating at the presidential palace. The coup makers have to be part of the old state apparatus, and only in the act of the coup itself attack the constitutional legality of the state. And then, as quickly as possible, the coup-makers will appropriate the trappings of state legality and declare that the coup was in defence of the state against whatever enemies they might care to invent. That is, the period of attack must be extremely brief, only a couple of hours, if the coup is to succeed.

(ii) frontal civil war

The maximum attack possible on the state with heavy weapons is the frontal civil war fought with a strategy of positional warfare rather like conventional international war. The first modern frontal civil war was the American Civil War 1861-65, and it still ranks as one of the most bloody civil wars ever, with 650,000 deaths out of a population of 30 millions. Current frontal civil wars include the conflicts of Sri Lanka, Azerbajdjan, and Angola. They are not asymmetric like a guerrilla war; with heavy weapons deployed by both sides the cities are not impregnable; and the firepower is so expensive and so destructive that whole nations can be devastated economically and physically 29.

Frontal civil wars are always extremely destructive because heavy weapons are deployed. Yet frontal civil wars can differ crucially depending on the territoriality of the attacked state. The war in Afghanistan had a dynamic very different from, say, the frontal war in Bosnia. It is significant that ethnic cleansing so dominant in Bosnia not seems to have taken place in Afghanistan. On the other hand the degree of destruction suffered by Kabul did not strike Sarajevo. Why?

In a general way the difference can be explained by the diverse territorialities of the two states. A nation state is embodied in its national territory and the bodies of all its citizens; the ethno-state of the Bosnian Serbs was embodied

29 The MPLA government in Angola mortgaged the oil-revenues until the year 2000 to pay for Soviet arms; most physical structures have been destroyed or damaged, as is easy to see if you travel through the country; I relate my first-hand impression of an overland journey through Angola in 1992 in, Fra Cape til Cairo. På motorcykel gennem Afrika. Hjalte Tin og Nina Ramsussen. Gyldendal. København, 1993. (German edition, Frederking und Thaler, München, 1994; Swedish edition, Annama Böker, Göteborg, 1995).
in the separate Serb land and in the privileged bodies of the ethnically pure Serbs. Accordingly the civil war in Bosnia was fought at the ethnic front for possession of the land of the Serbs and for 'cleansing' of that land of non-Serb bodies. In Afghanistan too ethnic discourses were very strong and basic in peoples' lives, but no single ethnic discourse correlated with the territory and human bodies making up the Afghan state. There was no such thing as an 'Afghan' ethnicity and nobody fought for an ethnically pure Afghanistan. The territoriality of the Afghan state was not land nor bodies, (whether the nation-state pragmatic totality of citizens or the ethno-state exclusive volk), but embodied in the capital or even just in the presidential palace: in the physical locus of state rule. Possession of that house was possession of the state; the man and the group possessing Kabul or just the presidential palace was the Afghan state. Furthermore, it is important to stress that logically there was an Afghan state all along. The point for the state attackers was not to 'cleans' Afghanistan, but to use the state to maximum benefit for their own ethnic, tribal or clan group - as the Pashtuns had done for two hundred years.

One may speculate that ethnic cleansing was meaningless in Afghanistan because the state was not embodied in human bodies; because they had no national elections they did not get ethnic cleansing. In Bosnia, on the other hand, they are attempting democratic elections, and then ethnic cleansing became important ot the powers that be.

V. AIR- AND SEABORNE WEAPONS

By air- and seaborne weapons I will understand three types.

(i) Military or non-military aircraft and ships carrying household weapons (foodstuffs, medicine, other aid items, etc.).

(ii) Military or non-military aircraft and ships carrying light and heavy weapons (machine guns, bombs, missiles etc.)

(iii) Land, air or sea launched un-manned airborne weapons-systems (planes, missiles and rockets; excluding handhold weapons-systems, i.e. Stinger-missiles which belongs to the 'light-weapons category).

Use of seaborne weapons is rare in civil wars. One of the few cases was the historic duel between the experimental steamboats Merrimach and Monitor on the
Potomac river in 1862 in the middle of the American civil war, and the Tamil Tigers using speedboats to attack Sri Lanka government vessels.

Apart from Saddam Hussein’s use of gas against the Kurds, atomic, bacteriological and chemical weapons have so far not been relevant to civil war, but they cannot be ruled out in principle. The present typology is based on (a) the most complex weapons used, i.e. operations including airforce as well as ground forces should be indexed by the use of airforce; and (b) by the forces attacking the state, i.e. when Anastasio Somoza ordered his fighter aircraft to bomb demonstrations demanding his resignation in Nicaragua in February and August 1978, it did not put the Nicaraguan civil war on the fourth level.

The minimum attack on the state possible with air- and sea-borne weapons is using planes and ships to bring in humanitarian aid to populations/groups in conflict with their state. I will call this type of sub-civil war humanitarian intervention. I am aware that ‘humanitarian intervention’ normally denotes all interventions on a humanitarian ticket. However I will argue that humanitarian intervention should be denoting sub-war interventions only, and not peace-enforcement-like interventions.

The maximum attack on the state possible with air- and sea-borne weapons is military action by a UN-mandated consortium of states, using any combination of blockade, naval attack, intervention by ground forces, and airstrikes against the troops, positions, installations etc. of a state fragmented by civil war. I will call this type of civil war inverse civil war.

Even if it is possible in theory to imagine a civil war being fought with airborne weapons by domestic factions only, this has not yet happened.\textsuperscript{30} Introduction of aircraft in violent attacks on the state signify in almost all cases external intervention of some sort. The social complexity of airborne weapons is so high that it is nearly always impossible for the state-attackers to win over useable parts of the national airforce. Until the final victory they will have no airforce and if they conquer the state they will inherit it all, and even then they might not be able to get planes in the air. But other states may find it in their interest to get involved, and for the intervening party aircraft will always be a strategically superior weapon, able

\textsuperscript{30} The Bosnian Serbs and the Afghan mujahidin have in fact managed to get a few old Yugoslav and Soviet planes in the air, but without any military effect.
to transcend the logic of frontal civil war, and for this reason spearhead the escalation of frontal civil war to inverse civil war.

(i) humanitarian intervention

Air- and sea-borne weapons however, do not begin with bombs and missiles, but with food. When hunger deliberately is used as a weapon by a state against groups of the population, food aid then becomes a weapon as well regardless of donor intentions. (See the very important contribution to this discussion, Macrea 1996).

That is why the category of air- and seaborne weapons should include military as well as humanitarian ‘weapons’. What distinguishes humanitarian intervention from traditional Red Cross aid is the element of violence used to enforce a policy of universal human rights, including the right to food if need be against the will of a sovereign state.

(ii) inverse civil war

The basic political assumption of peace enforcement is that a population does not necessarily always have the government it deserves. It realises that a genocidal state can attack a population that for various reasons cannot fight back. A situation can develop where the only possible defence of a population against an illegal, fragmented state is coming from the outside. The only attack from the outside not becoming a hostile invasion is an attack mandated by the UN as ‘peace enforcing’. However, all wars have been touted as peace-enforcing in age-old newspeak. Intervention by outside forces in a sovereign state with the meaning of violence redefined from invasion to ‘peace enforcement’ I shall prefer to call ‘inverse civil war’. Inverse civil war differs from humanitarian intervention by the higher intensity of violence, i.e. the use of offensive airborne weapons, that transgresses the military horizon of heavy weapons, as well as the political horizon of non-interference.

‘Inverse civil war’ is inverse because the attack on the state is inverted from groups inside the state to groups outside the state. I shall thus define inverse civil war as, a) an attack by an UN-mandated consortium of states, deploying airborne weapons, b) on a state/state-fragment ostracised by the world community. Reasons for ostracising a state can range from civil war atrocities, regionally destabilising state break-down, to genocide. Intifada, guerrilla civil war, as well as frontal civil war may initiate inverse civil war, or it may even take place without prior war, if, say, an
enforced humanitarian intervention in North Korea suddenly deteriorated dramatically
causing war-level casualties. Bosnia turned from a frontal civil war to an inverse
civil war with the NATO-airstrikes.

Inverse civil war blurs the distinction between intra-state war and inter-state
war in two movements: first by imploding sovereignty, an internal collapse of the
state power interpellating the national territory; second by exploding sovereignty,
transgressing from the outside the sovereignty of a state by subjecting it to ‘peace
enforcement’.

VI. CONCLUSION

Throughout this paper I have defined civil war as attack on the state by
groups of the population. This definition has been applied to cases of violence
ranging from riot to peace enforcement. It proved relatively straightforward to
classify attacks on the state according to the most complex weapons used in the
attack (not by the defending state), and I would like to think the proposed four
categories of weapons capture the essential steps in the technology of violence.
From household weapons (everyday items that only become weapons by being used
violently), to light weapons (all crew-portable weapons), to heavy weapons
(motorised, land based weapons), up to air- and seaborne weapons (including
household-, light-, and heavy weapons transported by air or sea).

Based on the four types of weapons, I identified a war-scale attack on the
state possible with each type of weapon. Each type of attack constitutes a basic type
of civil war: The civil war possible with household weapons is the intifada, a
sustained urban uprising. The civil war possible with light weapons is guerrilla war,
a sustained rural military opposition without fixed fronts. The civil war possible with
heavy weapons is frontal civil war, fought as positional warfare. Finally the civil war
possible with airborne weapons is inverse civil war where the attacking group is a
consortium of UN-mandated states.

In reality, however, any civil war will begin with violence less intense than
war. The full typology of civil war therefore should include the sub-war attacks on
the state. For each type of weapon we get a range from low to high intensity attack
on the state: The low-to-high range of attacks possible with household weapons is
riot-to-intifada; with light weapons it is terrorism-to-guerrilla war; with heavy
weapons it is *coup-to-frontal civil war*; and finally with air- and seaborne weapons it is *humanitarian intervention-to-inverse civil war*.

One of the provisionally conclusions of my study is the rejection of a *gradualist conception of civil war*, i.e. of a steady escalation from political agitation, to isolated terrorist-like attacks, on to guerrilla war, conventional war and finally the capture of the capital. In addition my research indicates it is impossible to win a guerrilla war

Each weapon-type signifies a specific degree of military, political and social complexity in the attacking group. No gradual shift from, say, light to heavy weapons seems to be possible. On the contrary is it only by radically changed external circumstances, like the end of the Cold War, not produced by the attackers themselves, that permit shifts up and down the weapons-type ladder.

A second conclusion has been the *ease in shifts of intensity from sub-war levels to war levels* in the history of individual conflicts (defined by a standard threshold of thousand deaths) but *within the same weapons category*. Riot can become intifada; terrorism can become guerrilla war; coup can become frontal civil war; and humanitarian intervention can become inverse civil war. My limited sample of cases indicate that escalation not is not likely to happen across weapon types: riot will rarely become, say, guerrilla war, coup will not become intifada, etc. Similarly, all the in-between cases will be somewhere on the continuum of violence within one type of weapon, for example in the case of Northern Ireland located somewhere between terrorism and guerrilla war on the range of light weapons attacks on the state but never approaching intifada or frontal civil war.

A third conclusion is the distinction between ethnic cleansing and civil war: *ethnic cleansing is not civil war but murderous interpellation*, i.e. creation and not destruction of a state (the same applies for genocide). To observe that ethnic cleansing and genocide creates states is, of course, not in any way an acceptance but on the contrary opens up for a better targeted critique of state practice.

Inverse civil war might be somewhat controversial as a category of civil war because it transgresses the national border. However, I think the transgression when a consortium of states subjects a fragmented state to peace enforcement, accurately reflects the implosion/explosion of Westphalian national sovereignty taking place today. These conflicts start as standard civil wars, often frontal civil wars, but at some point fragmentation of the state and gross violations of human rights pose a
direct threat to regional security. A new front then emerges between the general good, embodied in the UN-mandated force, and the particular evil, embodied in illegitimate state-fragment. This front will not follow any established national boundaries, it is not determined by *gross-macht* zones of influence or (neo)colonial hegemony. It is a civil war because it is fought inside the territory of a (former) nation state. By fighting inverse civil war the ad hoc consortium of states creates a new temporary whole. It may one day solidify into a new whole. Probably it will not become a global whole, rather a regional or imperial state-like entity. And then the consortium no longer will be the state-attacker but the state-defender, that is a new state. Perhaps this state will enjoy a post-national or imperial fluidity of territorial sovereignty. We do not know yet.

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Singer and Small’s primary interest, however, was in developing a typology that differentiated the various types of war. This typology was based upon their classification of the war participants, and they focused their attention on the members of the interstate system, or states, which by definition had to have the means of exerting their independence and playing a role in international relations (see the dataset of the system membership list). Civil wars were conducted between a state and a group within its borders. Subsequent changes in some of the classifications were adopted in intermediary releases of the data (see Sarkees, Meredith Reid. The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997. Conflict Management and Peace Science 18, no. 1 (Fall 2000): 123–144.) Downes, Alexander B., (2008), Targeting Civilians in War, Cornell University Press.Google Scholar. Fearon, James D., (1995), Rationalist Explanations for War, International Organization, vol. 49, no. 3, pp. 379–414.Google Scholar. Fearon, James D., Laitin, David D., (2003), Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War, The American Political Science Review, vol. 97, no. 1, pp. 75–90.Google Scholar. Fujii, Lee Ann, (2009), Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.Google Scholar. Kalyvas, Stathis N., (2005), Rethinking the Nature of War, Frank Cass chapter Warfare in Civil Wars, Abingdon, pp. 88–108.Google Scholar. Kalyvas, Stathis N., (2006), The Logic of Violence in Civil War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.Google Scholar. Sovereign and civil wars are declining, but civic conflicts encompassing various forms of violence in cities are on the rise. Cities are often havens of relative security in civil war; but it would be a mistake to take urban security for granted when war has ended. Major population movements and socio-economic ruptures often lead to widespread conflict in cities after civil war. Due attention needs to be paid to the often-overlooked effects of sovereign and civil conflict and post conflict reconstruction on the local, as well as national state; often municipal state capacities.